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INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected state and
federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither comprehensive in breadth, as
several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues within individual cases are omitted.
Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an authoritative guide; rather, they are intended
to alert the Alaska legal community to judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries
are grouped by subject matter. Within each subject, the summaries are organized alphabetically.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court
In Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court,1 the court of appeals held the Public
Defender Agency or the Office of Public Advocacy must pay for an indigent defendant’s travel to
the site of their trial, including the expenses of a parent accompanying a minor who is unable to
travel alone, if the defendant is (1) not in custody and (2) unable to afford transportation to trial.
J.B., a minor defendant represented by the Public Defender Agency, lives in Marshall and lacked
the funds to travel with a parent to Bethel to appear at his trial. The superior court ordered the
Public Defender Agency to pay for J.B. and his parent’s travel. The Agency appealed, arguing that
either the Division of Juvenile Justice or the Court System should be responsible those expenses.
The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s order, reasoning that the case presented a
question of administration best decided by deferring substantially to the state agencies responsible
for administering the Public Defender Agency’s authorizing statute. The court referenced two
Alaska Attorney General opinions issued in 1977 and 1978 respectively, declaring that the Public
Defender Agency is responsible for the transportation costs of indigent defendants, including
juveniles. The court of appeals reasoned that these opinions supported the Division of Juvenile
Justice’s argument that travel expenses are a necessary “service” or “facility” of representation,
required to be paid by the Public Defender Agency according to its authorizing statute. The court
also relied on a Department of Administration regulation that the court interpreted as accepting the
Attorney General’s opinion. Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that
the Public Defender Agency must pay the transportation expenses of an indigent defendant, not in
custody, who cannot afford to travel to their trial. The Agency must also pay for the expenses of a
parent accompanying a minor defendant who cannot travel alone.
Corkery v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Corkery v. Municipality of Anchorage,2 the supreme court held that section 21.15.010 of the
Anchorage Municipality Code (AMC) requires property owners to substantially satisfy each one
of its seven standards to obtain a zoning variance. In 1965, the Corkerys’ lot was zoned so that, at
maximum, 30% of the surface could be covered by a structure. However, in 1983 a prior owner
expanded the house beyond this limit without a variance. In 2013, when rot was found in a wall,
the Corkerys applied for a permit to rebuild that section of the home. The Municipality issued a
permit conditioned on the Corkerys first obtaining a zoning variance for the exceeded limit.
However, the zoning board denied the Corkerys’ application for a variance because it found three
of seven requirements for a variance were not met. On appeal the Corkery’s argued that the code
only required applicants “substantially” meet the seven criteria as a whole, and by meeting four of
them they had done so. The Supreme Court disagreed. The court reasoned that though the code’s
requirement that an application “substantially meet[] the . . . standards” could be read as the
Corkerys argued, it was more natural to read it to require applicants substantially meet each of the
seven standards individually. The court explained that this reading was supported by the individual
listing of each factor, that two of them operated interdependently, and that a separate portion of
the municipal code (which should be interpreted to create a harmonious whole) implied that in
reviewing an application the board must find each of the seven criteria to be substantially satisfied.
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The court concluded that the word “substantially” was not made superfluous by this interpretation
as it meant applicants need not satisfy each factor in full. Affirming the lower court’s decision, the
supreme court held that section 21.15.010 of the AMC requires property owners to substantially
satisfy each one of its seven standards to obtain a zoning variance.
Eberhart v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n
In Eberhart v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n,3 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that Section
15.13.145 of the Alaska Statutes prohibits the use of both a public entity’s cash and its nonmonetary resources for the purpose of influencing a state or municipal election of a state or
municipal candidate. AS 15.13.145(a)(4) prohibits elected officials from using “money held by
the entity [they work for] to influence the outcome of the election of a candidate to a state or
municipal office.” Eberhart allegedly used his city email address during his mayoral campaign to
email the city clerk to request all of the ordinances and resolutions that he and his opponent had
sponsored. APOC opened an investigation and concluded that most of Eberhart’s emails were
permissible under AS 15.13.145; however, it identified Eberhart’s email exchange with the clerk
as a possible violation. APOC imposed a $37.50 fine because the cost of sending the emails to the
clerk was de minimus and did not cause significant public harm; Eberhart appealed. The Supreme
Court of Alaska found that the phrase “to influence the outcome of the election” does not require
proof of actual influence as the word “to” can be understood to mean “for the purpose of.” Further,
the court found that it was reasonable for APOC to interpret the term “money” to include property
and assets including the city’s email system. The court explained that it was unlikely that the
legislature intended to ban public cash from being used to influence a candidate while allowing
public non-monetary resources to be used for the same purpose. Affirming the superior court’s
decision, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that that AS 15.13.145 prohibits the use of both a
public entity’s cash and its non-monetary resources for the purpose of influencing the outcome of
the election of a state or municipal candidate.
Griswold v. Homer City Council
In Griswold v. Homer City Council,4 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the attorney-client and
work-product privileges are state law exceptions to section 40.25.120 of the Alaska Statutes (the
Alaska Public Records Act), and that communications between members of quasi-judicial bodies
and their supporting staff are protected by deliberative process privilege. After a decision by the
Homer Board of Adjustment, Frank Griswold submitted two public records requests, the first for
communications between the Board and its advisor, attorney Holly Wells, and the second for the
Board’s invoices from the law firms Birch Horton and Levesque. The Board refused to provide
the communications citing deliberative process and attorney-client privilege, and though it
provided some invoice information it withheld much of it again citing attorney-client privilege.
Griswold appealed arguing that the communications were not privileged because Wells was a
neutral advisor, not an advocate for the board, and that attorney-client privilege simply did not
apply to the invoices. The supreme court disagreed. The court initially explained that the Alaska
Public Records Act gives the public the right to inspect public documents unless required to be
kept confidential by federal or state law, including by the common-law. The court noted that it
had previously held that the deliberative process privilege was such a common-law exception, and
3
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it reasoned that the long history and public interest behind the attorney-client and work-product
privileges required recognizing them as such too. The court then determined that the deliberative
process privilege applied to the communications, because they “occurred before the decision was
issued and contain[ed] give-and-take on the wording of the decision.” It explained that compelling
the disclosure of these materials would chill the deliberative process, undermining public trust and
dissuading frank discussion amongst city staff. As for the invoices, the supreme court refrained
from ruling on the substance of the materials, but rather, identified a procedural error in the
superior court’s determination of whether the materials were privileged under the attorney-client
and work-product privileges. Affirming the privilege of the communications and remanding for
reconsideration on the status of the invoices, the supreme court held that the attorney-client and
work-product privileges are state law exceptions to the Public Records Act, and that
communications between members of quasi-judicial bodies and their supporting staff are protected
by deliberative process privilege.
Nicolos v. N. Slope Borough
In Nicolos v. N. Slope Borough,5 the supreme court held that an administrative agency’s decision
regarding a state employee’s discharge is independently reviewed by the supreme court; deference
is given to the agency’s factual findings, but questions of law outside the agency’s special expertise
are subject to a “substitution of judgment standard.” Tom Donovan Nicolos worked for the North
Slope Borough Department of Public Works (the Borough) when he began having thoughts of
harming himself and others which he characterized as “unwelcome.” After informing his
supervisor of his thoughts, Nicolos was put on leave and eventually the Borough terminated him.
Nicolos appealed to the Borough Personnel Board, which concluded there was just cause for
discharge. Nicolos then appealed to the superior court, which reversed the Board’s findings in
part, but ultimately affirmed the termination. Applying an “independent review” standard, the
supreme court affirmed the Borough Personnel Board’s decision. The court explained that this
standard applies to appeals from administrative agency decisions. It elaborated that under it, while
no deference is shown to superior court rulings, three different standards of review apply to agency
conclusions depending on the context. The court said that first agency’s findings of fact are
accepted when supported by “substantial evidence,” and defined this as “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Second, the court
explained that questions of law involving “agency expertise or the determination of fundamental
policies within the scope of the agency’s statutory functions”, are subject to a “reasonable basis
test.” Finally, the court added that an agency interpretation of law beyond its special area of
expertise is shown no deference under the “substitution of judgment standard.” Applying the
substitution of judgment standard, the court found that an employee may be punished under the
Borough’s personnel rule against threats when a reasonable person could interpret the employee’s
actions as conveying intent to cause physical harm. Under this interpretation, and accepting the
Board’s factual findings as true, the court concluded the Board’s finding that Nicolos’s statements
were punishable threats was supported by substantial evidence. Affirming the Board on all issues,
the supreme court held that an administrative agency’s decision regarding a state employee’s
discharge is independently reviewed by the supreme court; deference is given to the agency’s
factual findings, but questions of law outside the agency’s special expertise are subject to a
“substitution of judgment standard.
5
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Odom v. State Division of Corporations
In Odom v. State Division of Corporations,6 the supreme court held that a Medical Board’s
decision to impose sanctions must be supported by sufficiently substantial evidence that the
doctor’s actions demonstrated professional incompetence. Odom was accused of providing
substandard care to his patient by administering excessive thyroid hormone treatment and by
proscribing phentermine to a patient with cardiomyopathy (a heart condition). An administrative
law judge held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that no disciplinary sanction was warranted
because the Licensing Division had failed to prove that Odom’s actions fell below the standard of
care. However, the Medical Board voted unanimously to reject the administrative judge’s decision
and revoke Odom’s Alaska medical license. Odom appealed and the superior court vacated the
decision and remanded the matter to the Board to consider Odom’s late-filed opposition that it had
initially failed to consider. The Board reaffirmed its decision and the superior court affirmed the
Board’s decision. Odom appealed, claiming that the Medical Board lacked substantial evidence to
support its decision. The supreme court held that the Board must prove by sufficient evidence,
assuming a preponderance standard applied, that the doctor demonstrated professional
incompetence by lacking the sufficient knowledge, skills, or professional judgment to a degree
likely to endanger the health of the patient. Further, the court noted the legislature expressly
warned against basing a finding of professional incompetence solely on a doctor’s unconventional
or experimental practices in the absence of demonstrable physical harm to the patient. Reversing
the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that a Medical Board’s decision to sanction
must be sufficiently be supported by substantial evidence that the doctor’s actions demonstrated
professional incompetence.
Pease-Madore v. State Dep’t of Corrections
In Pease-Madore v. Alaska Dep’t of Corrections7, the supreme court held that a prisoner’s
procedural due process rights in a disciplinary hearing are satisfied by the use of incident reports
as evidence and audio recordings as documentation of that hearing. Pease-Madore was disciplined
for making threats of bodily harm and creating a disturbance; the superior court affirmed these
disciplinary actions. Pease-Madore filed three appeals arguing that the Alaska Constitution’s due
process requirement for a “verbatim record of the [disciplinary] proceedings” from McGinnis v.
Stevens,8 was in addition to, rather than in place of, the requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell.9 In
Wolff, the United States Supreme Court held federal procedural due process in prisoner
disciplinary hearings requires “a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on
and the reasons” for disciplinary action.10 Pease-Madore argued that a verbatim record alone, as
required by McGinnis, failed to satisfy Wolff. The supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the
McGinnis standard is “a more protective requirement that can satisfy the written statement
requirement.” The court elaborated that if the recording includes information about the evidence
relied upon in the disciplinary action, and the reasons for how a decision was reached, then a
verbatim record better fulfills the goals served by requiring a written statement. Finally, the
supreme court also held that an incident report can serve as part of the evidentiary basis for a prison
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disciplinary decision. According to 22 AAC 05.455(a), if a prisoner does not request the presence
of the facility staff member who wrote the disciplinary record, the report may be used as evidence
by the disciplinary tribunal to make a decision. The supreme court explained that in cases such as
this one, where the staff member is present, nothing precludes the report from being considered as
evidence. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s ruling that audio
recordings of disciplinary hearings as required under McGinnis satisfy the procedural due process
requirement for a written record, and that a prisoner’s incident reports can serve as the basis of a
disciplinary decision even if the staff member who wrote that report is present.

6

BUSINESS LAW
Cox v. Estate of Cooper
In Cox v. Estate of Cooper,11 the supreme court held that Alaska’s usury statute12 does not limit
the maximum interest rate parties may specify on loans with a principal amount greater than
$25,000.13 The Coopers loaned Cox $325,000 at an interest rate of 20% to be paid back in six
months. Seven years later, after extensions and an interest rate reduction to 8%, the loan trustee
gave notice of default and began foreclosure proceedings on Cox’s home which had been put up
as collateral. At the time Cox still owed $315,500 in principal and nearly $145,000 in accrued
interest, roughly $98,000 of which stemmed from the original 20% interest rate. Cox filed a
complaint, arguing that subsection (a) of the usury statute, which sets the “state interest rate” of
loans at 10.5%, applies to all loans that do not fall under subsection (b). He noted that subsection
(b) does not apply to loans with a principal amount in excess of $25,000 and so concluded that the
Coopers’ 20% interest rate violated the usury statute. On rehearing the superior court disagreed,
finding that the legislative history indicated that the 10.5% state interest rate only applied when
parties had not specified a rate on their own. The supreme court affirmed. It reasoned that the
simplest reading of the statute indicates that subsection (b) governs all loans with express interest
rates. The court noted that its own precedents had assumed as much, and after a thorough review
of the legislative history it concluded that the legislative history supported this result as well.
Applying this interpretation, the court concluded that subsection (b) of the usury statute governed
the loan to Cox as it contained an express interest rate, and that therefore there was no statutory
limit on the permissible interest rate as the principal amount exceeded $25,000. Affirming the
superior court’s conclusion that the loan did not violate the usury law, the supreme court held that
Alaska’s usury statute does not limit the maximum interest rate parties may specify on loans with
a principal among greater than $25,000.
Hooks v. Alaska United States Federal Credit Union
In Hooks v. Alaska United States Federal Credit Union14, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed
the superior court’s ruling that discredited both the “vapor money” and “unlawful money” theories
as attempts to nullify a mortgage agreement. Hooks obtained a loan from Homestate Mortgage
Company LLC (Homestate) to refinance an existing loan, which was secured by his property and
a promissory note. Homestate then sold the promissory note and the beneficial interest in the deed
to Alaska USA Federal Credit Union (Alaska USA). In 2015, Hooks defaulted on the loan and
Alaska USA referred the defaulted loan and deed of the trust for foreclosure through Alaska’s
statutory nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosure process, resulting in its sale to Dennis Albert. Hooks
sued, contending that his property could not be foreclosed on because the National Bank Act did
not authorize Homestate to lend credit meaning issuing the loan was beyond its power. Hooks also
claimed that the promissory note he gave was the equivalent of money that was created by his
signature. As a result, Hooks argued that by giving the bank a promissory note in exchange for
credit, he was defrauded into giving something of value to the bank for something which is
worthless, in violation of the National Bank Act. The Supreme Court of Alaska rejected these
11
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arguments and stated, “the vapor money and unlawful money theories have been repeatedly
rejected by every court to consider the issue.” The Court held that the transfer of money to a third
party, or what Hooks describes as mere “credit” can serve as a valid basis for an enforceable loan.
Lastly, the Supreme Court of Alaska dismissed Hooks’ claim that the deed was invalid and stated
conveyances of interests of land and deeds of trust do not have to be signed by the lender in order
to be valid. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s ruling that the
“vapor money” and “unlawful money” theories are not legitimate arguments to negate a loan, and
a deed does not need to be signed by the lender in order to be a valid conveyance.
Pederson v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp.
In Pederson v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp.,15 the supreme court held that Alaska law permits
corporations to unilaterally demand a reasonable confidentiality agreement when shareholders
request copies of the shareholder list. Pederson requested a shareholder list from Arctic Slop Reg’l
Corp. (ASRC). ASRC agreed under the condition that Pederson sign a confidentiality agreement,
but after obtaining the list Pederson refused to comply with the agreement or to return the list
stating that the agreement was unenforceable. ASRC brought suit against Pederson for breach of
contract, seeking injunctive relief for the return of its confidential information and a declaratory
judgment permitting ASRC to withhold confidential information from Pederson for two years. The
trial court ruled in favor of ASRC and Pederson appealed, claiming that the confidentiality
agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law because the information was not confidential. The
supreme court recognized that section 10.06.413 of the Alaska Statutes requires corporations to
provide a shareholder list for shareholder inspection at corporate offices twenty days before
shareholder meetings, but it does not require providing shareholders with their own copies of the
list. Therefore, the supreme court reasoned that shareholders seeking personal copies of the list
must submit their requests under section 10.06.430 of the Alaska Statuttes, which permits a
corporation to request a confidentiality agreement “as a prerequisite to distributing otherwiseinspectable documents.” Vacating the superior court’s declaratory judgments as moot but
otherwise affirming the decision, the court held Alaska law permits corporations to unilaterally
demand a reasonable confidentiality agreement when shareholders request copies of the
shareholder list.

15

421 P.3d 58 (Alaska 2018).
8

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Brooks Range Petroleum Corp. v. Shearer
In Brooks Range Petroleum Corp. v. Shearer,16 the supreme court held that the proper venue for
tort claims is where the harmful force of the tort first took effect, and that proper venue for contract
claims is where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. While weighing
a full-time employment offer from British Petroleum, Shearer was covering as a drilling consultant
for the Brooks Range Petroleum Corp. (“BRPC”) near Nuiqsut in the Second Judicial District. A
BRPC executive approached him with an employment offer, verbally guaranteeing ten years of
job security. The contract was signed in Anchorage in the Third Judicial District, where Shearer
performed most of his work. When he was terminated three-and-a-half years later, Shearer sued
BRPC for breach of contract and tort claims, serving the complaint in the Third Judicial District
in Anchorage but filing the suit in the Second Judicial District. Denying BRPC’s motion to dismiss
for improper venue or alternatively to transfer venue to Anchorage, the lower court found that
Shearer’s contract claims arose in Anchorage, but his tort claims arose in the Second Judicial
District, and that public concerns of the local community near Nuiqsut weighed in favor of
maintaining venue in the Second district. The supreme court reversed the lower court, reasoning
first that the tort claims actually arose in the Third Judicial District because the “harmful force” of
the alleged misrepresentation happened when Shearer was terminated in Anchorage. The court
further explained that the Second Judicial District was not a proper venue for the breach of contract
claim, because contract claims “arise[] where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the
claim occurred” and no part of the alleged breach occurred in the Second Judicial District.
Reversing and remanding for a transfer of venue to the Third Judicial District, the supreme court
held that the proper venue for tort claims is where the harmful force of the tort first took effect,
and that proper venue for contract claims is where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the
claim occurred.
City of Kodiak v. Kodiak Public Broadcasting Corp.
In City of Kodiak v. Kodiak Public Broadcasting Corp.,17 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that
courts may not award full attorneys’ fees under section 09.60.0101 of the Alaska Statutes unless a
claimant raises a constitutional issue in their complaint or similar claim for relief. In September
2015, the Kodiak Police Department reportedly used excessive force in detaining an autistic
suspect. Following the incident, radio station Kodiak Public Broadcasting Corporation (KMXT)
requested the release of relevant public records pursuant to the Alaska Public Records Act. When
the City refused, KMXT filed a complaint seeking to compel the disclosure of a list of withheld
records, three chest camera videos, and all records that were not exempt. On December 22, the
superior court ordered the immediate release of the three camera chest videos, prompting the City
to release all relevant public records. KMXT subsequently sought full attorneys’ fees pursuant to
section 09.60.0101 of the Alaska Statutes arguing that it had asserted a constitutional claim when
seeking public records because Alaska courts had “characterized a citizen’s access to public
records as a fundamental [constitutional] right.” The superior court apparently agreed, issuing a
declaratory judgment for KMXT and granting the station’s request without explanation. On appeal,
the supreme court determined that KMXT had “prevailed entirely on statutory grounds.” The court
16
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noted that KMXT had not explicitly raised constitutional issues until its motion for attorneys’ fees.
Reasoning from precedent, the court explained that for a claimant to assert a constitutional right
under section 09.60.010 of the Alaska Statutes, they must raise that right in the complaint or similar
claim for relief. As the superior court had never even been asked to rule on whether the Alaska
Public Record’s Acts grant of a right to public records derives for the constitution, the court
concluded that KMXT had failed to raise a constitutional complaint. Reversing and remanding
for a calculation of partial attorneys’ fees under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82, the supreme
course held that courts may not award full attorneys’ fees under section 09.60.0101 of the Alaska
Statutes unless a claimant raises a constitutional issue in their complaint or similar claim for relief.
Fink v. Anchorage
In Fink v. Anchorage,18 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that in directly reviewing a municipal
assembly’s decision to levy a special assessment, a court will defer to the Assembly’s expertise
and only reverse upon proof of fraud or arbitrariness. Decades after an earthquake destroyed the
neighborhood of Turnagain Heights, lot owners petitioned the Municipality of Anchorage for
utility projects to improve the neighborhood. The owners approved the Municipality’s cost
estimates, and the Assembly accordingly created three special assessment districts to raise the
funds necessary for the improvements. The Municipality then consolidated the projects with an
unrelated fourth project for “maximum cost and schedule efficiencies,” ultimately shifting roughly
$1,000,000 in costs for the fourth project onto owners of properties in the special assessment
districts. Benefits from this fourth project flowed to properties within the special assessment
districts and to other properties beyond them. Fink and other owners filed an appeal in superior
court arguing that they were improperly forced to bear disproportionate costs of the fourth project
considering the wider dispersion of benefits. The superior court ruled that the Assembly needed
to conduct an adjudicatory hearing on the matter, and following the hearing the Assembly affirmed
its earlier allocation of the costs. Unsatisfied, the property owners renewed their appeal. In
reviewing the Assembly’s decision, the Supreme Court attached a deferential “presumption of
correctness” to special assessments levied by an assembly. The court explained that overcoming
such a presumption requires a showing the Assembly “acted fraudulently or arbitrarily in
determining the assessment amounts.” Affirming the judgment of the superior court, the supreme
court held that a presumption of correctness attaches to special assessments of a municipal
assembly, and that this can only be overcome by a showing of fraud or arbitrariness.
Gross v. Wilson
In Gross v. Wilson,19 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a properly challenged erroneous
judgment is not void unless the deciding court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or violated due
process. In the final divorce agreement between Robert Gross and Dawn Wilson, Gross agreed to
regularly pay Wilson half of the value of his monthly United States Coast Guard (USCG)
retirement and disability pay. A little over a year later, Gross unilaterally reduced the monthly
payments of $888.22 by $170, claiming his disability pay was indivisible under the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA). Wilson moved to enforce the agreement and
Gross countered with his own motion to set aside the agreement as it allegedly violated the
USFSPA. The superior court granted Wilson’s motion and denied Gross’s on the theory that the
18
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superior court was merely enforcing a contractual agreement to pay a set amount regardless of the
source of the funds rather than impermissibly dividing military disability pay as marital property.
Further the superior court found that Gross had no procedural basis for bringing his motion well
past the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by Alaska Civil Rule 60(b). Gross appealed the
superior court’s ruling but made no mention of its finding on the Rule 60(b) issue. On appeal, the
supreme court explained that a Rule 60(b) motion is the only way to get relief from a final judgment
on a property division. It elaborated that such a motion must be based on one of six specified
reasons, and that Gross could only be based his motion on Rule 60(b)(4), an argument that the
judgment was void for violating USFSPA. Without deciding the issue, the court recognized that
Gross had a potentially valid argument that the superior court’s judgment was erroneous for
violating USFSPA. However, the court refused to find the judgment void. The court explained
that while an erroneous divorce decree is voidable if properly challenged, the judgment itself is
not void unless the deciding court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or violated due process.
Finding that Gross had alleged neither defect, the supreme court affirmed holding that a properly
challenged erroneous judgment is not void unless the deciding court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction or violated due process.
Lum v. Koles
In Lum v. Koles,20 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that in opposing a motion for summary
judgment, a plaintiff may overcome the defense of qualified immunity, under section
09.65.070(d)(2) of the Alaska Statutes, when the record contains at least some objective evidence
capable of supporting an inference of malice. Qualified immunity grants municipal employees
immunity from a suit for damages when performing a discretionary function in good faith. Daniel
Lum, a resident of North Slope Borough, had accused police officers of corruption, and had
multiple altercations with Officer Grimes in particular. On September 18, 2007, Grimes and a
fellow officer, Gutierrez, were dispatched to the Lums’ home to complete a welfare check when a
neighbor reported a domestic dispute. The officers claimed they heard shouting in the residence
but their audio-tapes did not pick this up and the Lums disputed this claim. When Grimes and
Gutierrez knocked on the door, the Lums’ children allowed them in and were apparently not
distressed. Neither officer identified themselves or their purpose for entering. They eventually
discovered the Lums, with their baby, arguing in the bathroom. A dispute between the officers
and Daniel culminated with Grimes pepper-spraying and cuffing Daniel, some of the spray hit
Daniel’s wife Polly and their infant. The Lums sued for invasion of privacy and trespass. The
superior court dismissed both claims on summary judgment, reasoning that the officers were
protected by qualified immunity; the Lums appealed. The Supreme Court of Alaska disagreed. It
explained that qualified immunity only protects officers acting in good faith; therefore, a plaintiff
can overcome it by showing officers acted corruptly, maliciously, or in bad faith. The court
continued that because summary judgment is not granted unless no genuine issue of material fact
exists, and because the record is taken in the best light for the non-movant, demonstrating malice
is a low bar at that stage of proceedings. The court concluded that the Lums met this bar as a jury
could reasonably find the officers had entered the residence in bad faith without an actual belief
that an emergency existed. Reversing the superior court’s decision, the court held that in opposing
a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff may overcome the defense of qualified immunity when
the record contains at least some objective evidence capable of supporting an inference of malice.
20
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Olivera v. Rude-Olivera
In Olivera v. Rude-Olivera,21 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that (1) “a party who fails to make
required pretrial disclosures ‘without substantial justification’ may not . . . use that information as
evidence at trial, ‘unless such failure is harmless,’” and (2) a party is entitled to recover enhanced
attorney’s fees if the other party has acted in bad faith throughout the case. Ronalda Rude-Olivera
was the primary breadwinner during her marriage to Anthony Olivera. The couple sold their home
in Alaska to move to California for Anthony’s supposed cancer treatment, with Ronalda
occasionally returning to Alaska for work. However, after convincing Ronalda to quitclaim her
interest in the property to him in order to avoid foreclosure, Anthony then had his girlfriend take
over payments for the property. During the divorce proceedings, Anthony repeatedly delayed the
trial and attempted to damage Ronalda’s reputation at work. Though Anthony sought a missing
tax return from his ex-wife, the supreme court determined that it was not essential to the case and
that Ronalda had thus complied with the discovery requirements. In awarding enhanced attorney’s
fees, the lower court first noted that it would not have ordinarily awarded such fees in the “absence
of vexatious conduct” given her stronger financial position. However, it then found that Anthony’s
conduct throughout the proceeding exhibited bad faith and awarded a “modest” fee. The Supreme
Court affirmed concluding the lower court had followed the required process to award enhanced
attorney’s fees. Accordingly, it held that a harmless failure to disclose information is excusable,
and enhanced attorney’s fees may be awarded if the other party has acted in bad faith.
Strong v. Williams
In Strong v. Williams,22 the supreme court held that despite pre-trial dismissal with prejudice of a
landowner’s settled claims against his neighbors, res judicata and collateral estoppel do not
preclude subsequent claims against a municipality on the same underlying facts. Since 1974, John
Strong has owned property in Anchorage; since the 1980s, the property has experienced significant
flooding as a result of a neighbor’s access road, which the Municipality was made aware of in
1993. In 2010, Strong sued James and Suzie Williams, two neighbors, for trespass and nuisance
and sought a court order to abate the flooding. He ultimately released the claims in exchange for
compensation and a promise to upgrade the road, filing a stipulation in July 2012 dismissing all
claims with prejudice. In 2015, Strong filed another suit, this time including the Municipality of
Anchorage, seeking compensatory damages and the removal of the road. The superior court
granted a subsequent motion to dismiss by the Municipality on the basis of collateral estoppel and
res judicata. The supreme court held that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applied
because the Municipality was not in privity to the original suit and the issues at hand were not
actually litigated prior to the settlement. The court explained that in order to trigger res judicata,
there must be (1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) from a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in
a dispute between the same parties about the same cause of action. It found that the third prong
was not satisfied. The court continued explaining that in order to trigger collateral estoppel, the
issue must have previously been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment.
The court found that this requirement had not been met as settlement of the prior claims prevented
actual litigation from occurring, and the stipulation did not explicitly preclude other litigation.
Reversing, the supreme court held that despite pre-trial dismissal with prejudice of a landowner’s
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settled claims against his neighbors, res judicata and collateral estoppel do not preclude subsequent
claims against a municipality on the same underlying facts.
Toni 1 Trust, by Tangwall v. Wacker
In Toni 1 Trust, by Tangwall v. Wacker,23 the supreme court held that section 34.40.110(k) of the
Alaska Statutes cannot deprive either federal or other states’ courts of jurisdiction over fraudulent
transfer actions. In 2007, a Montana court issued multiple default judgments against Tangwall and
his family, leading them to transfer property to a trust created under Alaska law. Bertran Tangwall
subsequently filed for bankruptcy in Alaska which placed her interest in the trust under a federal
bankruptcy court. Fraudulent transfer actions were successfully brought against the Tangwalls in
both a Montana court and in federal bankruptcy court. Tangwall then filed a complaint in Alaska
state court, arguing that section 34.40.110(k) of the Alaska Statutes provides Alaska courts with
exclusive jurisdiction regarding such fraudulent transfer actions making the judgments against the
Tangwall’s void. Citing Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. George,24 the supreme court
found uncompelling the argument that the Full Faith and Credit Clause compels states to follow
another state’s law asserting exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of whether the other state’s law
created the cause of action.25 Citing Marshall v. Marshall,26 the supreme court held that a state
court cannot limit federal jurisdiction even when the issue arises under that state’s law.27
Furthermore, if this was not the case, the supreme court found it likely that the Supremacy Clause
would prevent section 34.40.110 of the Alaska Statutes from restricting the federal bankruptcy
court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s judgment
dismissing Tangwall’s complaint, holding that 34.40.110 of the Alaska Statutes cannot provide
exclusive jurisdiction to Alaska state courts over fraudulent transfer actions.
Whalen v. Whalen
In Whalen v. Whalen,28 the supreme court held that to obtain a new long-term domestic violence
protective order a person must allege a new violent incident that has not previously served as the
basis for such a protective order, using incidents that served as the basis for a prior order would
violate res judicata. Sarah Whalen had received multiple domestic violence protective orders
against her husband Sean Whalen. Sarah petitioned to extend an existing protective order, but the
superior court denied, explaining that Sarah would have to file for a new protective order. Sarah
petitioned for a new protective order, but the superior court again denied, explaining that Sarah
could not use incidents of domestic violence that served as the basis of her previous order to obtain
a new one. The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the superior court, reasoning that res judicata
extinguishes previous claims of domestic violence for which a domestic violence protective order
has already been granted. It explained that while domestic violence is cyclical the statutory scheme
requires a new incident to justify a new order. Affirming the lower court’s opinion, the supreme
court held that to obtain a new long-term domestic violence protective order a person must allege
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a new violent incident that has not previously served as the basis for such a protective order, using
incidents that served as the basis for a prior order would violate res judicata.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Graham v. Durr
In Graham v. Durr,29 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a defendant may, in a civil proceeding,
assert his right against self-incrimination while the defendant’s direct appeal of his sentence is
pending. In August 2013, Stacey Graham struck and killed two pedestrians while driving under
the influence. In May 2014, the victims’ families filed suit against Graham. In February 2015,
Graham plead guilty and was sentenced to 32 years imprisonment. One month later, Graham
appealed his sentence, not his conviction, and around the same time he was served with a number
of discovery requests in connection with the civil lawsuit. Graham refused to answer some of the
questions in these requests (and questions in similar requests from his former employer a year
later), asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Graham’s former
employer and the victims’ families moved to compel Graham to respond to these discovery
requests and to prevent Graham from asserting his privilege. They argued that the privilege only
applies when there is a risk that one’s testimony could increase criminal penalties and that because
Alaska does not allow sentences imposed during resentencing to exceed the original sentence,
Graham could not assert the privilege. The superior court granted this motion to compel. On
appeal, the supreme court reversed. It explained the standard for whether a defendant can assert
the privilege against self-incrimination is whether the testimony “could expose him to a real and
substantial hazard of incrimination.” The court reasoned that though Graham could not face a
“greater punishment,” than his initial sentence, he could still face adverse consequences if
compelled to testify thereby facing “greater punishment” than “if he were permitted to invoke the
privilege.” Reversing and remanding, the court held that defendants can assert their privilege
against self-incrimination in a civil proceeding on the basis of a pending appeal of a criminal
sentence.
Huber v. State Dep’t of Corrections
In Huber v. State Dep’t of Corrections,30 the supreme court held that, with the possible exception
of very simple cases, a hearing officer in a prison disciplinary proceeding must include the basis
for their decision in writing or through a recording in order to satisfy due process. Huber was an
inmate at the Goose Creek Correctional Center who was cited for a disciplinary violation. A
hearing officer subsequently found him guilty without stating any reasoning. The superior court
upheld the hearing officer’s decision, finding that Huber had waived his due process argument by
failing to raise it in the prison appeal process, and finding that Huber failed to show he had been
prejudiced by the lack of written findings. On appeal, the supreme court reversed, first determining
that Huber did forfeit his due process claim by failing to raise it because he was not advised that
failing to raise it could result in forfeiture and he lacked legal help in filing his appeal. The court
further reasoned that because the hearing officer’s written decision and the recording of the hearing
included no reasoning supporting the finding of guilt, it was impossible for a reviewing body to
29
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properly review the decision. The court noted that review may be possible without a statement of
reasoning in a very simple case when there is both no room to debate the basis for an officer’s
finding of guilt, and the officer’s reasoning can be reliably inferred. The court concluded this was
not such a case. Reversing the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that, with the
possible exception of very simple cases, a hearing officer in a prison disciplinary proceeding must
include the basis for their decision in writing or through a recording in order to satisfy due
process.31
Kowalski v. State
In Kowalski v. State,32 the court of appeals held that retroactive application of Alaska Evidence
Rule 404(b)(4) did not violate the ex post facto clauses of the Alaska Constitution or the United
States Constitution. In 1996, investigators declined to charge Kowalski for the death of his
girlfriend Perry, whom by his account he accidentally shot and killed with a shotgun while
traveling in Alaska. In 2008, Kowalski shot and killed his girlfriend Morin in Montana. Although
Kowalski claimed that Morin’s death was accidental, he later pleaded no contest to mitigated
deliberate homicide. After the Montana shooting, Alaska reopened the investigation of Perry’s
1996 death, and Kowalski was indicted and convicted of second-degree murder. At trial the state
presented evidence of the Montana shooting pursuant to Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(4) which
makes evidence of other crime of domestic violence admissible in the prosecution of a crime of
domestic violence. On appeal, Kowalski argued that retroactively applying Rule 404(b)(4), which
was enacted one year after Perry’s death in 1997, violated the ex post facto clauses of the Alaska
and United States constitutions. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision,
reasoning that the clauses do not apply to Rule 404(b)(4) as it is an ordinary rule of evidence which
only governs admissibility. The court distinguished Rule 404(b)(4) from rules of evidence that
alter the type or quantum of evidence legally required, contrasting it with the Texas statute the
United States Supreme Court refused to apply retroactively in Carmell v. Texas.33 Affirming the
lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that retroactive application of Alaska Evidence
Rule 404(b)(4) did not violate the ex post facto clauses of either the Alaska Constitution or the
United States Constitution.34
Simmons v. State Dep’t of Corrections
In Simmons v. State Dep’t of Corrections,35 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that though AS
11.56.760 has a retroactive requirement that persons convicted of certain crimes provide a DNA
sample, it is not an ex post facto law under the Constitution of Alaska. David Simmons was found
guilty of four felonies in September of 1995. As part of his mandatory parole in February 2014,
he was asked to provide a DNA sample, he refused. The Department of Corrections subsequently
found him guilty of violating AS 11.56.760, which makes it a class C felony for people convicted
of certain crimes to refuse to provide a DNA sample to an officer upon request. AS 11.56.760
went into effect on January 1, 1996, and in 2003 its requirements were made retroactively
applicable to all convictions “that occurred before July 1, 2003 if the person was incarcerated or
31
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was under supervised probation or parole for the offenses on or after July 1, 2003.”
Acknowledging that the law applied to him, Simmons appealed, ultimately arguing to the supreme
court that the retroactive application of AS 11.56.760 as applied to him violated Alaska’s ex post
facto clause because he was convicted in 1995 before the law ever went into effect. The Supreme
Court of Alaska held that the DNA sample requirement does not fit the definition of an ex post
facto law: “any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent
when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; or
which deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time
when the act was committed.” The court used the “intent-effects” test to determine whether the
statute imposed a punishment, thereby violating the ex post facto clause of the Alaskan
Constitution. Under this test, a court first determines if the legislature intended the law to act as a
punishment. If yes then the law violates the clause, but if the answer is no, the court analyzes the
effects of the statute according to seven factors to determine whether the statute serves an
alternative purpose or if it violates the clause by effectively operating as a punitive measure.36
After analyzing the seven factors the court concluded the DNA registry was not punitive. In
particular, it noted the registry has a “valid regulatory purpose” to aid law enforcement in
enhancing public safety, its requirements are less burdensome than the Alaska Sex Offender
Registry Act (ASORA), and the means of collecting the DNA—a mouth swab—is minimally
intrusive. Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that though AS 11.56.760 has a
retroactive requirement that persons convicted of certain crimes provide a DNA is retroactive, it
is not an ex post facto law under the Constitution of Alaska.
Smith v. State
In Smith v. State,37 the Alaska court of appeals held that to determine if two crimes constitute a
single offense for double jeopardy purposes “a court must compare the different statutory
provisions as applied to the facts of the case.” Smith, along with three other men broke into
Benjamin Gall and Amanda Swafford’s apartment while they were sleeping, struck Gall in the
face and head, and stole items from the apartment. Smith was tried with two others (the fourth was
never captured) and found guilty of first-degree robbery, first-degree burglary, second-degree
assault, and second-degree theft. At sentencing, the court merged the robbery and theft verdicts
into a single conviction and rejected Smith’s proposed mitigating factor. Smith argued on appeal
that under the double jeopardy clause of the Alaska Constitution,38 he could not lawfully receive
separate convictions for the first-degree robbery and the second-degree assault since the two
constituted the “same offense.”39 The court of appeals analyzed the elements of each statutory
provision and held that although robbery requires the additional element of “intent to prevent or
36
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overcome resist[a]nce to the taking or retention of property,” the differences between that and the
assault charge “were not substantial enough to justify multiple convictions” since the threat of
immediate harm from the robbery was the same threat of fear of imminent serious physical injury
that constituted the assault. The Court also rejected the State’s contention that the jury’s separate
special verdict indicated Smith was convicted for each crime on the basis of separate and distinct
acts. The court of appeals remanded for merger of the judgments of first-degree robbery and
second-degree assault, holding that Alaska’s double jeopardy clause did not permit separate
convictions when the charges were based on the same underlying conduct as the elements of the
two offenses are too similar.40
Walker v. State Dep’t of Corrections
In Walker v. State Dep’t of Corrections,41 the supreme court held (1) a prisoner has a due process
right to call witnesses in a disciplinary hearing and (2) a prisoner does not waive this right by
failing to raise it during the administrative appeals process. In October 2013, Walker, an inmate,
began work developing an outline of topics he thought would be helpful for new inmates. In
August 2014, Baumgartner, a department of corrections (DOC) employee, met discovered that
though Walker was being paid, he had not worked since November 2013. According to
Baumgartner, Walker claimed he informed four staff members of the mistake, though he could
only name two, and he had sent a “Request for Interview Form” to contact officers. Soon after this
meeting, Baumgartner conducted an investigation and found none of Walker’s claims to be true.
Based on this, the DOC charged Walker with “stealing government property” and providing “false
statements” to a staff member.” Walker requested three witnesses at his hearing, but the presiding
officer denied this request and found Walker guilty, ordering restitution of $316. Walker appealed
to the superintendent, but his appeal was denied. Walker then appealed to the superior court
presenting an additional claim that the DOC violated his due process rights by not allowing him
to call witnesses in his defense. The superior court denied Walker’s appeal, determining that “some
evidence” supported the guilty finding and that Walker waived his right to assert a due process
violation when he failed to raise it in his administrative appeal to the superintendent. The supreme
court reversed reasoning that prisoners often lack the time and expertise to effectively present and
preserve constitutional claims as they have no right to legal assistance and limited resources in
preparing their appeals. Further, it explained that Walker’s due process rights had been violated
because while a hearing officer may decline to call witnesses, the officer must document reasons
for this declination and this had not occurred. Reversing and remanding the matter for a new
hearing, the supreme court held (1) a prisoner has a due process right to call witnesses in his
defense for disciplinary hearings and (2) a prisoner does not waive his due process right to call
witnesses by failing to raise it during the administrative appeals process.
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CRIMINAL LAW
Ladick v. State
In Ladick v. State,42 the court of appeals held that when the government prosecutes defendants for
breath-test refusal it must prove a causal connection between the arrest and the act of driving or
operating a motor vehicle. After a state trooper discovered Ladick intoxicated while sitting in a
parked car in a power line easement, Ladick was charged with DUI and breath-test refusal. Ladick
testified that he had arrived at the easement approximately three hours before the trooper arrived,
drank a six-pack, then did not drink for about two and a half hours. A jury found Ladick guilty of
breath test refusal, but acquitted him of the DUI charge. On appeal, Ladick argued that the trial
judge improperly prevented him from arguing that his act of driving was too remote from his arrest.
The court of appeals disagreed, reasoning that the relevant inquiry should be on whether Ladick
was driving or operating a motor vehicle during the incident which gave rise to his arrest, not on
how much time had elapsed since that incident. The court further explained that regardless of when
Ladick arrived at the scene, if there was probable cause to find that he was intoxicated while
driving to the scene or while maintaining control of the vehicle at the scene, he had a duty to take
a breath test. Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that when the
government prosecutes defendants for breath-test refusal, the government must prove a causal
connection between the arrest and the act of driving or operating.
Luch v. State
In Luch v. State,43 the court of appeals held that a married person is not entitled to a heat of passion
defense based on the discovery of adultery unless the married person has personal knowledge of
such adultery. In 2010, Luch overheard his wife, Jocelyn, talking with another man on the
telephone. This began a period of great tension in their marriage. A couple months later, after Luch
was unable to locate Jocelyn at a race, Luch shot and killed Jocelyn in their home during an
altercation in which Luch had accused Jocelyn of seeing another man. On appeal, Luch argued
that the trial judge erred in refusing to give a jury instruction on the heat of passion defense. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial judge’s decision, reasoning that Luch was not subjected to
serious provocation as required under the statute. The court explained that discovering one’s
spouse in the very act of adultery was sufficient to constitute serious provocation at common law.
However, the court explained that discovery must be based on personal knowledge because
Alaska’s statutory definition of serious provocation disqualifies hearsay reports or mere
suspicions. There was no evidence that Luch had personal knowledge or even a reasonable belief
that Jocelyn was having an affair. Affirming the judgement of the lower court, the court of appeals
held that a married person is not entitled to a heat of passion defense based on the discovery of
adultery unless the married person has personal knowledge of such adultery.
Patterson v. Walker
In Patterson v. Walker,44 the supreme court held that prisoners may not use a civil suit for damages
to attack the validity of their criminal convictions or sentences. After trial, Patterson was convicted
of seven counts of possession of child pornography. Two years later, Patterson filed a 121-page
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civil complaint alleging that various state actors had directly harmed Patterson and had violated
his Constitutional Rights. The superior court approved the State’s motion to dismiss, concluding
that Patterson had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The supreme court
affirmed the ruling of the superior court on different grounds, holding that a judgment in favor of
Patterson would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. The court reasoned that
allowing civil actions that would necessarily invalidate the plaintiff’s criminal convictions would
create the potential for two resolutions emerging from the same incident. It concluded that because
of this danger, and the fact that civil suits are a poor vehicle for challenging the validity of a
criminal conviction or sentence, such suits should only be allowed after the conviction or sentence
has been set aside in a criminal proceeding. In affirming the superior court, the supreme court held
that prisoners may not use a civil suit for damages to attack the validity of their criminal
convictions or sentences.
Pfister v. State
In Pfister v. State,45 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that a surviving felony accomplice may be
prosecuted for manslaughter when a fellow accomplice is killed by the victim or responding police
officers. Brian Albert Pfister and two accomplices broke into the home of a marijuana grower and
robbed him. Pfister waited outside while his accomplices entered the home and demanded the
grower’s money. The grower led the accomplices to a safe where he had a hidden handgun; he
used it to shoot and kill both accomplices. Pfister ran away but was later arrested and convicted
of, inter alia, two counts of manslaughter for causing the deaths of his two accomplices. Based on
Alaska’s restrictive definition of felony-murder, Pfister argued he could not be convicted of
felony-murder. The court of appeals said that under Alaska’s felony-murder statute, “a person
cannot be convicted of felony-murder based on the death of one of the other participants in the
felony.” Analyzing the development of the felony-murder rule and misdemeanor manslaughter,
the court concluded that manslaughter has traditionally been “a residual category of unlawful
homicide,” encompassing any unlawful killing that does not constitute murder. Thus, the court
explained that unlike felony-murder manslaughter makes up a much broader category of crime,
but also requires proof of mens rea regarding the possibility that the defendant’s conduct could
result in death. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court and held that a
defendant could be prosecuted for manslaughter but not felony-murder for the death of an
accomplice at the hands of the victim or the police.
State v. Doe
In State v. Doe,46 the supreme court held individuals convicted out-of-state may only be required
to register in Alaska as sex offenders if their conviction was under an out-of-state law “similar” to
an Alaskan law. Two cases consolidated on appeal presented similar facts. In the first, John Doe
I plead guilty to “communicating with a minor for immoral purposes” in violation of Washington
law, and was required to register in Washington as a sex offender. When Doe I planned to travel
to Alaska, he petitioned the Alaska DPS Offender Registry to see if he would have to register there.
He was told that he would have to register in Alaska for life. The Alaska superior court granted
him relief, which DPS appealed. John Doe II was convicted of “annoying or molesting a child
under 18” in violation of California law and was sentenced to register as a sex offender there. Prior
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to sentencing, Doe II moved to Alaska and did not register. Subsequently, DPS determined that
Doe II’s conviction resembled an Alaskan offense sufficiently so that he had to register as a sex
offender. Doe II appealed to the superior court, which affirmed DPS’s decision. Doe II appealed,
and the two cases were joined. The supreme court said the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
(ASORA) requires individuals convicted of sex offenses to register as a sex offender, and “sex
offense” is defined to include convictions under “a similar law of another jurisdiction.” The court
explained that it determines whether a conviction was under a similar law by comparing the law’s
elements to the most comparable Alaskan sex offense, rather than comparing the underlying facts
of the offense to the Alaskan statute. It elaborated that where an individual convicted under a more
restrictive out-of-state statute could also be convicted under an Alaskan statute the laws are
automatically considered similar. However, the court cautioned that just because an individual
could not be convicted under an Alaskan statute does not mean the compared laws are dissimilar.
The court broadly interpreted laws to be “similar” when their elements are only categorically alike;
it clarified that the elements need not be identical or even substantially similar to qualify as
“similar.” Despite this low standard, the court found both the Washington and the California laws,
while at a very general level like the relevant Alaska offenses, to be significantly different from
and considerably broader than the purportedly “similar” Alaskan laws. Therefore, the supreme
court affirmed the superior court in Doe I’s case, and reversed and remanded the superior court’s
decision in Doe II’s case, holding that individuals convicted out-of-state may only be required to
register in Alaska as sex offenders if their conviction was under an out-of-state law “similar” to an
Alaskan law.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Anderson v. State
In Anderson v. State,47 the court of appeals held that an intimate relationship between a minor and
a high school music teacher indicted on sexual abuse constituted a crime of domestic violence,
therefore qualifying for a statutory exception to spousal immunity from adverse testimony. A
music teacher allegedly engaged in sexual relations on school grounds with a 15-year-old student
for several months in 2014. Following grand jury indictment of the teacher for multiple counts of
sexual assault, the State indicated that it intended to call the teacher’s wife as a witness, specifically
in regard to admissions the teacher made to her about his acts. The wife asserted spousal immunity
under Alaska Evidence Rule 505(b). The state responded that Rule 505(b)’s exception for a crime
of domestic violence applied to this case. The lower court ruled for the state, concluding that under
section 18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes, the relationship between the student and teacher made
the student a household member, and so the crime was one of domestic violence. On appeal, the
wife argued that domestic violence should be given its everyday meaning centered around a
familial relationship, and that the student and her husband could not be in a recognized relationship
because the student was not old enough to consent. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s
ruling. It reasoned that the statute’s plain language evidenced an intent to define anyone dating,
or engaged in a sexual relationship, to be a household member regardless of the legality of this
relationship. The court explained that the legislature intended to broaden legal protection to
victims. It noted however that this language did not create an “any child” exception to the
privilege, and that only the legislature could broaden the exception to that degree. The court
concluded that the sexual or romantic relationship between the student and teacher, made the
student a household member, and so the sexual assault was a crime of domestic violence, and
spousal privilege was inapplicable. Affirming the ruling of the lower court, the court of appeals
held that an intimate relationship between a minor and a high school music teacher indicted on
sexual abuse constituted a crime of domestic violence, which fell under exemptions to spousal
immunity from adverse testimony.
Alvarez-Perdomo v. State
In Alvarez-Perdomo v. State,48 the court of appeals held that defendants must clearly and
unequivocally state their desire to testify before a judge directs them to take the stand. AlvarezPerdomo was convicted of first-degree assault for shooting his mother. At trial, AlvarezPerdomo’s attorney announced that he did not intend to present a defense case, which triggered
the judge’s obligation to personally question Alvarez-Perdomo on his decision not to testify. After
several attempts to clarify whether Alvarez-Perdomo wanted to testify, the judge pressed him and
Alvarez-Perdomo said, “It seems so. I don’t know. I am not a lawyer.” The judge then directed
Alvarez-Perdomo to take the stand and testify. Alvarez-Perdomo later appealed his conviction,
arguing that the trial judge forced him to testify at trial, thus violating his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. Accepting Alvarez-Perdomo’s argument, the appellate court
nonetheless affirmed. It explained that under the Lavigne rule, whenever the attorney representing
a criminal defendant announces that the defense intends to rest without presenting the defendant’s
testimony, the trial judge must personally address the defendant to make sure the defendant
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understands that they have the right to testify, and that the decision whether to testify rests solely
with the defendant, regardless of their defense attorney’s advice or wishes. When a judge asks a
defendant whether they wish to testify and the defendant offers only equivocal responses, a judge
must order the trial to proceed without the defendant’s testimony, rather than risk the prospect of
forcing a defendant to testify. Because Alvarez-Perdomo did not clearly state his desire to testify,
the trial judge committed constitutional error by coercing Alvarez-Perdomo to take the stand, but
this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the other evidence supporting his
conviction. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed and held that defendants must clearly and
unequivocally state their desire to testify before a judge directs them to take the stand.
Alaska Dep’t of Public Safety v. Superior Court
In Alaska Dep’t of Public Safety v. Superior Court,49 the Court of Appeals held that state courts
may not order transportation of a prisoner between facilities absent extraordinary circumstances.
While the underlying criminal action against William Hoogendorn was pending, the lower court
granted a motion requesting the Department of Corrections move Hoogendorn to a different
facility for psychological evaluation. Upon reconsideration, the lower court determined the
Department of Corrections was not responsible for transporting prisoners between facilities and
instead directed the Department of Public Safety to move the prisoner. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals determined that the lower court lacked statutory to direct transportation because (1) the
first subsection at issue was inapplicable and (2) courts have “extremely limited” authority to
interfere with the Departments’ internal workings. The Court of Appeals reserved courts’ authority
to interfere for “extraordinary circumstances,” which were absent in the case at hand.
Circumstances that could qualify might include a threat to a defendant’s physical safety or due
process rights, but not merely an attempt to cut costs. Reversing the lower court’s decision, the
Court of Appeals held that courts may not exceed their authority by ordering transportation of
prisoners.
Beier v. State
In Beier v. State50, the court of appeals held that the Anchorage superior court’s standing order,
limiting the time for filing peremptory challenges, was unenforceable because it conflicted with
the provisions of Criminal Rule 25(d) and does not fall within the Superior Court’s authority under
Criminal Rule 53. Beier was notified at a Tuesday trial call that Anchorage superior court Judge
Kevin Saxby was assigned to preside over his case. Beier’s attorney filed a preemptory challenge
under Rule 25(d) the following Monday. However, the superior court ruled that Beier’s attorney
did not file his challenge in time according to a standing order of the Anchorage superior court,
which required challenges to be filed within a day and a half. The State argued that the Anchorage
standing order is lawful according to Alaska Criminal Rule 53, which gives the courts the authority
to relax or dispense with criminal rules “in any case where it shall be manifest to the court that a
strict adherence to them will work injustice.” The State contended the standing order is governed
by Rule 53 in order to promote court efficiency and prevent undue delay such as issues relating to
witness availability. On appeal, the court held Criminal Rule 53 does not apply to this situation.
The court reasoned that the Anchorage superior court’s standing order is a rule of local practice,
and is actually governed by Administrative Rule 46. However, Rule 46(b) precludes the standing
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order because no local order can be administered if it conflicts with the Alaskan statutes or the
rules of the court. Ultimately, the court reversed the superior court’s denial of Beier’s peremptory
challenge of Judge Saxby and should have followed Criminal Rule 25(d), which allows each party
to file its preemptory challenge within five days. This case may be subject to correction if
rehearing is sought and granted
Brown v. State
In Brown v. State,51 the supreme court held that a claim that appellate counsel had a conflict of
interest, and a request to disqualify an appellate judge, should be raised as part of a post-conviction
relief petition rather than in an immediate appeal to the supreme court. Brown petitioned the
supreme-court for a hearing after the court of appeals upheld Brown’s convictions for sexual abuse
of a minor and incest. The supreme court denied Brown’s request and affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals. The supreme court agreed with the state that Brown’s claims could be
incorporated into a post-conviction relief application, and reasoned that Brown’s claims would be
difficult to review without a trial court record. Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held
that an assertion of conflict of interest against appellate counsel and a request for disqualification
for a judge should be made as part of a post-conviction relief petition rather than as a hearing
before the supreme court.
Cardenas v. State
In Cardenas v. State,52 the court of appeals held that the single-purpose container exception to the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to gun cases if the incriminating nature of their contents is not
immediately apparent. Jesus Cardenas was pulled over for reckless driving and, in the course of
that traffic stop, informed the officer that he had a gun in a case on the backseat. The case was
fully zipped closed and out of Jesus’s reach. The officer took the gun case back to his car, where
he searched through several of its small compartments and found cocaine before searching the
primary compartment which contained Jesus’s gun. This officer to called in backup and fully
searched the vehicle, uncovering more cocaine and methamphetamines. Cardenas moved to
suppress the evidence as the result of an unlawful seizure. The motion was denied, and he was
convicted on several drug and weapons-related offenses. The court of appeals found that although
the gun case may have been lawfully seized, neither officer safety nor the single-purpose container
exception justified the officer’s warrantless search of the container. The court agreed with the
state that the United States Supreme Court’s single-purpose container exceptions established that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for containers whose contents can be inferred from
their appearance, including gun cases. However, it interpreted the exception to only apply when
the “incriminating nature of the container’s contents is immediately apparent.” The court
explained that in this case there was nothing obviously unlawful about Cardenas’s possession, so
the fact that there was clearly a gun inside the case did not automatically waive his expectation of
privacy in the case’s contents. The court also noted that there was no officer safety justification
to the search as any potential danger dissipated once the officer removed the case from Cardenas’s
car. Finding the search to be improper, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the singlepurpose container exception to the Fourth Amendment does not apply to gun cases if the
incriminating nature of their contents is not immediately apparent.
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Charles v. State
In Charles v. State,53 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that revoking a defendant’s probation for
“good cause” does not necessarily depend on the defendant’s willful violation but on whether the
corrective aims of probation can be achieved. James Allen Charles Jr. was a repeat sex offender
whose probation and parole had been revoked multiple times. Charles struggled to meet his
probation obligations, frequently arriving late to his appointments and testing positive for drug and
alcohol use. Consequently, the State petitioned to revoke Charles’s probation for missing a
polygraph appointment. Despite Charles’s “honest mistake,” the superior court found that Charles
had failed to take reasonable steps to avoid missing his appointment. Because his failure to attend
had not been due to circumstances outside his control, the superior court determined the violation
reflected “a larger pattern of noncompliance with his probation obligations and a failure to fully
engage in treatment.” On appeal, Charles argued that it was error to revoke his probation without
a finding that he had “willfully” violated its terms. The supreme court disagreed, explaining that
the good cause required to revoke probation under section 12.55.110 of the Alaska Statutes does
not necessarily require a willful violation. However, the court also rejected the state’s argument
that a defendant’s culpability was irrelevant. Instead the court reasoned that it was one of three
factors relevant to determining whether good cause exists: (1) the nature of the probation condition
violated, (2) the mental state of the violator, and (3) the significance of the violation in terms of
whether the defendant is “amenable to continued probation supervision.” The court concluded
that good cause exists when continuing the probationary status would “be at odds with the need to
protect society and society’s interest in the probationer’s rehabilitation,” and that revocation of
probation should only occur when it appears that the “‘corrective aims of probation cannot be
achieved.’” Applying this, the court concluded that the superior court’s finding of a pattern of
noncompliance was sufficient to support its revocation of Charles’s probation. Affirming, the
court of appeals held that revoking a defendant’s probation for “good cause” does not necessarily
depend on the defendant’s willful violation but on whether the corrective aims of probation can be
achieved.
Chinuhuk v. State
In Chinuhuk v. State,54 the court of appeals held that felony sex offenders sentenced under §
12.55.125(o) must serve out their probation, despite completing their term of imprisonment.
Section 12.55.125(o) requires that courts suspend a specified amount of the imprisonment term of
a defendant convicted of a sexual felony, and that the felon be placed on probation for a specified
number of years after completing their term of imprisonment. The five felony sex offenders in this
consolidated appeal violated probation. At their probation revocation hearings, they requested that
the superior court impose their remaining suspended jail time and terminate their probations. The
superior court refused to terminate their probations because § 12.55.125(o) declared that special
terms of probation imposed under it could not be suspended or reduced. The felony sex offenders
appealed, arguing there was no indication the legislature intended to alter the normal rule that
probation must be accompanied by a suspended term of imprisonment. The court of appeals
rejected this argument and found that the legislature intended to impose mandatory probation,
which could not be suspended or refused, on all felony sex offenders. Furthermore, the legislature
enacted § 11.56.759 one year after § 12.55.125(o), which ensured the mandatory probation term
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remained enforceable even if a sex offender completed the entire term of imprisonment. Thus, the
court of appeals affirmed and held that felony sex offenders sentenced under § 12.55.125(o) must
serve out their probation, despite completing their term of imprisonment.
Hamburg v. State
In Hamburg v. State,55 the Court of Appeals held that the pre-2018 version of the Alaska bail
statute, formerly section 12.30.011 of the Alaska Statutes, violated the constitutional provision
requiring reasonable conditions of bail release be set for a defendant who has not yet been
convicted. Hamburg was charged with manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide as a result
of the death of her two-year-old daughter. Hamburg’s bail release eligibility was governed by the
pre-2018 version of Alaska’s bail statute. The statute declared that when a criminal defendant is
charged with manslaughter, a rebuttable presumption exists that the defendant should not be
released on bail. Applying this presumption, the superior court issued a no-bail order. Hamburg
appealed arguing the order violated the Alaska Constitution’s bail provisions. In response, the
State argued that the statute could be constitutionally interpreted so that a defendant, who is
presumed to not be releasable, bears the burden of demonstrating that certain bail conditions would
ensure the defendant’s appearance at future proceedings and the safety of victims and the public.
The Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that precedent and the Alaska Constitution guarantee
a right to pre-conviction bail. The court concluded that both the statute violated this guarantee. It
further reasoned that an alternative interpretation of the statute, that would require a defendant
offer up conditions of bail but place the burden of persuasion on the state, would also violate the
constitution. Directing the trial court to set bail conditions, the Court of Appeals held the pre-2018
version of the Alaska bail statute violated the constitutional provision requiring reasonable
conditions of bail release for a defendant who has not yet been convicted.
Hess v. State
In Hess v. State56 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a prosecutor’s unsupported improper
statements during closing arguments constitute plain error if they meet all four prongs of the Adams
v. State test. In September 2011, Anchorage police were called to a reported assault of Patricia
Hess by her son Christopher. As part of the defense strategy, witnesses testified that Patricia forgot
to take her medicine, exaggerated things, and was a danger to herself. The prosecutor during his
closing remarks responded to this by arguing that Patricia was being “vilified” as a former victim
of sexual assault, and he speculated about her mental health and her family’s motives in testifying
against her though evidence at trial had not gone into those subjects. Hess did not object to any
of these statements in closing argument. On appeal, Hess argued for the first time that the
prosecutor’s closing arguments were improper, and despite his failure to object at trial, he argued
the statements constituted plain error. The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed Hess’s claim using
the four-part test for plain error review established in Adams v. State. It explained that all four
factors must be met to constitute plain error: “(1) there must be error, and the error must not have
been the result of an intelligent waiver or a tactical decision to not object; (2) the error must be
obvious, meaning it should be apparent to any competent judge or lawyer; (3) the error must affect
substantial rights, meaning that it must pertain to the fundamental fairness of the proceeding; and
(4) the error must be prejudicial.” The court elaborated that, on the issue of prejudice, the state
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has the burden of proving constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
for a non-constitutional error the defendant has the burden of proving there is a reasonable
probability that it affected the outcome of the proceeding. Ultimately, the court held that all fourprongs of the Adams test were satisfied. It explained that first, Hess did not waive his objection
and had not chosen to abstain from objecting for tactical reasons. Second, the prosecutor’s
argument lacked evidentiary support and “improperly denigrated the defense lawyer’s trial
strategy.” Third, Hess’ fundamental rights were impacted because the prosecutor’s statements
created a high potential for unfair prejudice. Fourth, the Court held that there was a reasonable
probability that the prosecutor’s statements impacted the trial’s outcome, especially because
“prejudicial comments made during closing arguments are more likely to be prejudicial and less
likely to be mitigated by curative instructions.” Reversing, the supreme court held that a
prosecutor’s unsupported improper statements during closing arguments constitute plain error if
they meet all four prongs of the Adams v. State test.
Johnson v. State
In Johnson v. State,57 the court of appeals held that a court must affirmatively assess probation
conditions restricting familial association with special scrutiny. In 2012, during an altercation
between Johnson and a man named Michael Plummer, Plummer was stabbed and killed by
Johnson’s son Spencer. Johnson plead guilty to manslaughter, but the terms of his probation
following his incarceration were left open to the court. It adopted a probation condition that
prevented Johnson from knowingly associating with another felon, with exceptions for his wife
(who had an unrelated felony conviction) and son so long as each party remained in compliance
with his or her parole. On appeal, the state argued that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to
hear Johnson’s appeal because Johnson agreed to his term of imprisonment in his plea bargain.
The court distinguished Johnson’s term of imprisonment and his probation conditions, recognizing
that Johnson appealed the latter and that accordingly the court had jurisdiction. The court found
that Johnson’s probation conditions restricted his constitutional rights of familial association, and
that the lower court needed to apply special scrutiny to these conditions. Concluding that nothing
in the record supported a necessary restriction of association between Johnson and his wife, the
court reversed that probation condition. As to the condition restricting association with his son, the
court vacated and remanded, observing that the lower court did not subject the condition to special
scrutiny and expressing concerns about the vague and broad operation of the condition in practice.
Otherwise affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a court must
affirmatively assess probation conditions restricting familial association with special scrutiny.
Jordan v. State
In Jordan v. State,58 the Supreme Court of Alaska held (1) that failure to instruct the jury on an
essential element of a crime is a structural error and so is not susceptible to harmless error review,
and (2) that a mental state as toward the weight of marijuana in a defendant’s possession is an
essential element. Police found 15 marijuana plants on Jordan’s property. Possession of four or
more ounces of marijuana is a felony. The police used a non-statutorily approved method to
determine that the weight of the marijuana was in excess of four ounces. At trial, Jordan wanted
to testify that he did not expect the amount of marijuana to be above four ounces when measured
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by the statutory method. The trial judge denied the testimony and did not require the state to prove
that Jordan knew the amount of marijuana in his possession. The court of appeals rejected the
state’s argument that the criminal statute did not require proof of a mental state and held that it
was error to exclude Jordan’s testimony, but it concluded that these errors were harmless and so it
affirmed. Jordan petitioned for review arguing that the trial court’s errors were structural and not
subject to harmless error review. Reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court found failure
to instruct the jury as to a mental state was a structural error because it affected the framework of
the trial rather than just the trial process. Assuming that Jordan’s marijuana possession implicated
his constitutional privacy rights, the supreme court explained that denying Jordan a jury instruction
on his mental state “essentially direct[s] a verdict for the prosecution on one of the essential
elements of the charge,” thereby altering the very framework of the case and infringing on Jordan’s
right to a jury trial. The supreme court elaborated that this also constituted a structural error
because applying harmless error review would create practical problem. Reversing and remanding,
the supreme court held that (1) to fail to instruct the jury as to every essential element is structural
error requiring automatic reversal, and (2) if possession of marijuana implicates a privacy right, a
mental state toward the weight of that marijuana is an essential element.
Lambert v. State
In Lambert v. State59 the court of appeals held that the Osborn standard does not apply to
applications for post-conviction DNA testing under section 12.73 of the Alaska Statutes. In 1982,
Ann Benolken and her husband were raped and killed in a double-homicide committed by two
individuals. Lambert was convicted of the murder of Ann while his alleged accomplice Telles was
acquitted of both murders. In 2010, the Alaska legislature enacted a post-conviction DNA testing
statutory scheme, which allows defendants to seek DNA testing in support of a claim of factual
innocence. Lambert filed an application for DNA testing of the remaining physical evidence from
his case, arguing that it could lead to the true perpetrators of the murder. Applying Osborn, the
superior court found that Lambert failed to show that DNA testing would conclusively establish
his innocence and denied his application. On appeal, Lambert argued that the superior court erred
by holding him to a higher standard than the statute required. The court of appeals agreed,
explaining that section 12.73.020(7) of the Alaska Statutes only requires a defendant to show that
DNA testing, if favorable, could indicate a “reasonable probability” that the petitioner is innocent.
The court explained that the superior court erred in applying the Osborn standard for postconviction DNA testing, because Osborn supplied the standard that had to be met in the absence
of a statutory right to post-conviction DNA testing. The court concluded that since a statutory
right now existed, the Osborn standard no longer applied. However, the court noted that Lambert
had failed to challenge other substantial evidence supporting his conviction, including his own
testimony, and that the superior court did not err in concluding that Lambert failed to show that
favorable DNA testing would raise a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would be
different. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the result below while holding that the Osborn
standard did not apply to applications for post-conviction DNA testing under section 12.73 of the
Alaska Statutes.

59

No. A-11699, 2018 WL 6005629 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2018).
27

Marshall v. State
In Marshall v. State,60 the Court of Appeals of Alaska held that a defense counsel’s stipulation to
an element of an offense is procedurally permissible, even without a personal waiver by the
defendant, so long as the trial court instructs the jury on all of the elements of the offence, including
the element covered by the stipulation. Defendant Marshall was a convicted sex offender who was
required to register. Marshall complied with his registration requirements until June 2013, when
he failed to submit his annual registration. He was arrested and charged with second-degree failure
to register as a sex offender. A person commits the crime if he (1) is required to register; (2) knows
that he is required to register; and (3) fails to file the annual or quarterly written verification. At
the beginning of trial, Marshall’s attorney offered to stipulate to the first element to prevent the
jury from learning that Marshall’s underlying sex offense was for sexual abuse of a minor.
Marshall himself did not personally waive the first element. The trial court instructed the jury on
all of the elements of the offense, including the element covered by the stipulation, and on the
State’s burden to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Marshall guilty.
Marshall appealed, arguing that the stipulation effectively removed an element of the charged
offense from the jury’s consideration and it was therefore an error for the court to instruct the jury
on the stipulation without first obtaining Marshall’s personal waiver of his right to a jury trial on
that element. The court of appeals disagreed. It explained that in a jury trial, even when the parties
reach a stipulation concerning an element of the offense, the stipulation must be presented to the
jury. It explained that the stipulation merely serves as evidence, and the jury must still make a
determination as to the element of the crime it supports. The court of appeals concluded that
therefore the stipulation did not remove an element from the jury’s consideration, and so no
personal waiver by the defendant was needed in this case. Therefore, affirming the trial court’s
decision, the court of appeals held that a defendant’s stipulation to an element of an offense is
procedurally permissible, even without a personal waiver by the defendant, so long as the trial
court instructs the jury on all of the elements of the offence, including the element covered by the
stipulation.
McGuire v. State
In Mcguire v. State,61 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that when an officer has probable cause to
arrest an individual for a drug offense, and has reason to believe that the individual might have
other evidence of that offense on his person, the officer is authorized to conduct a pat-down search.
During a traffic stop, McGuire was asked to step outside of his car because his insurance was
invalid. McGuire informed Officer Butler that he had a pocketknife in his front right pocket.
During the pat-down, but before locating the pocketknife, Butler found a marijuana pipe. Butler
continued the pat-down, found the pocketknife, and then found more drug paraphernalia. McGuire
was indicted on two counts of fourth-degree controlled substance misconduct and one count of
sixth-degree controlled substance misconduct. Following his indictment, McGuire requested
suppression of most of the evidence against him, claiming that Officer Butler violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when Butler continued patting-down McGuire after finding the pocketknife.
The trial court denied this request and McGuire was convicted of all three drug charges; he
appealed. The court of appeals reasoned that that the discovery of the marijuana pipe before
obtaining the pocketknife made it reasonable to suspect that McGuire may be carrying more
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evidence of that crime. Affirming the superior court’s decision, the court of appeals held that when
an officer has probable cause to arrest an individual for a drug offense, and has reason to believe
that the individual might have other evidence of that offense on his person, the officer is authorized
to conduct a pat-down search.
Medina v. State
In Medina v. State,62 the court of appeals held that probationers are able to seek credit for time
spent in earlier court-ordered treatment programs for the purposes of subsequent probation
revocation proceedings. After Medina violated his probation, the superior court ordered him to
complete a residential treatment program. Although Medina successfully completed the program,
he then violated his probation again the following year, causing the superior court to impose a
portion of his previously suspended sentence. Medina requested credit for the time spent in the
treatment program, but the State argued that Medina’s time in treatment was not served “in
connection” with the later probation violation. The superior court agreed with the State, reasoning
that granting credit for earlier programs would create a “reserve of credit” that could nullify the
penalties of later probation violations. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that probation
revocation proceedings are not independent of the original criminal proceedings, acting rather as
continuations. Further, it concluded that worries about reserve of credit were outweighed by
constitutional concerns that defendants may serve sentences longer that originally imposed.
Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that probationers are able to seek credit for
time spent in earlier court-ordered treatment programs for the purposes of subsequent probation
revocation proceedings.
Osborne v. State
In Osborne v. State,63 the court of appeals held that, to obtain a search warrant covering anyone
arriving at a premises during the execution of the warrant, the police must affirmatively establish
good reason to believe that any and all persons who arrive will likely be participants in the criminal
activity investigated. In Osborne, the police executed an arrest warrant at the residence of a third
party, Young. After discovering a number of drug related items throughout the residence, the
police applied for a second warrant to search the premises. A boilerplate attachment to the warrant,
listing items to be searched, contained a provision granting authority to search any person on the
premises. But the warrant application did not reference this provision, nor did it explain the need
for this grant of authority or why it might be justified. During the search, the defendant, Osborne,
knocked on the door and he was then detained, questioned, and searched. The police discovered
$8,390 in cash, 3.5 grams of methamphetamine, and a cell phone containing texts between Young
and Osborne. Armed with this evidence, the police obtained a warrant to search Osborne’s house,
where they seized drugs, money, and weapons. Osborne was later convicted of a number of drug
and weapons offenses. Prior to the trial, Osborne’s attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence
found during the search of Osborne and the search of his house. He argued that the initial search
was unlawful because the police failed to establish probable cause granting them the authority to
search any person who arrived on the premises, and that the evidence obtained during the second
search was the fruit of the unlawful first search. The superior court rejected this argument, siding
with the State, which argued that because the warrant established probable cause that illegal drugs
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were sold out of the residence, there existed a logical inference that any and all persons who arrived
on the premises during the search would also be buying or selling drugs. The court of appeals
reversed the lower court, holding that to obtain a broad grant of search authority, the police must
at least acknowledge they are asking for the right to search unknown persons and provide a
showing of probable cause, typically by detailing the character of the premises, the nature of the
illegal activity, the number and behavior of persons expected at the premises, whether some of
these people are unconnected with the illegal conduct, and the precise area and time the illegal
activity will take place. The court of appeals remanded the case for consideration of the State’s
alternative argument that the police had independent, lawful reasons to detain and search Osborne.
Pulusila v. State
In Pulusila v. State,64 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that in interpreting a condition of probation,
a court must consider (1) whether a particular interpretation would ensure public safety or foster
the defendant’s rehabilitation, and (2) how a reasonable person in the defendant’s place would
understand the probation condition. In September 2016, Pulusila was on felony probation. As part
of his probation, Pulusila was prohibited from having (1) any ammunition or explosives in his
“custody, residence, or vehicles” or (2) any drug paraphernalia in his “residence or . . . any vehicle
under his control.” After borrowing another man’s truck, Pulusila was pulled over by the
Anchorage police. The police searched the truck and found a small explosive device, ammunition
for a firearm and a methamphetamine pipe. Based on this discovery, the State petitioned the
superior court to revoke Pulusila’s probation. Pulusila asserted that the truck was borrowed and he
was unaware of the discovered items; he argued that because he had no mental culpability his
probation should not be suspended. The superior court rejected this argument, applied strict
liability, and revoked Pulusila’s probation. The court of appeals reversed, explaining that a
reasonable person in Pulusila’s circumstances would not understand the conditions of probation to
allow revocation of probation for unknowing possession of prohibited items. The court further
explained that because conditions of probation must be reasonably related to rehabilitating an
offender or protecting the public, ambiguous conditions should be given a meaning to further those
purposes. The court found there was no clear public benefit to using a strict liability standard.
Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that in interpreting a condition of probation, a
court must evaluate (1) whether a particular interpretation would ensure public safety or foster the
defendant’s rehabilitation and (2) how a reasonable person in the defendant’s place would
understand the probation condition.
R.C. v. State
In R.C. v. State,65 the court of appeals held that courts are authorized to consider a juvenile’s ability
to pay when setting the amount of restitution. In 2014, at the age of fifteen, R.C. and another
juvenile started a damaging fire on an elementary school playground. R.C. admitted guilt and was
charged as a delinquent minor. At the restitution proceedings, the State argued that R.C. and the
other juvenile should be jointly and severely liable for the full amount of the damages caused by
their actions, which would make R.C. (and his parents) personally liable for $159,161.71. After
acknowledging R.C.’s limited assets, the superior court adopted a payment schedule that addressed
R.C.’s ability to pay, but that did not adjust the amount owed on that basis. R.C. appealed this
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ruling, arguing that he did not have the financial means to pay the restitution amount, and that the
trial court should have considered this when determining the amount of restitution to be ordered.
The court of appeals vacated and remanded the trial court’s decision, finding that R.C.’s argument
was supported by the plain meaning and legislative intent of section 47.12.120(b)(4) of the Alaska
Statutes. The court of appeals distinguished restitution proceedings for adults, where ability to
pay may not be considered, from those for minors by focusing on the statutory language requiring
that restitution for minors be “suitable.” The court reasoned that this indicated financial
information from the minor and the minor’s parents should be considered in setting the amount of
restitution. Moreover, the court of appeals asserted that both the legislative history of the statute
and prior caselaw indicated that in the State of Alaska restitution is designed to not just be helpful
to the victim, but to also aid in the rehabilitative process. It explained that setting restitution for
minors above what could possibly be paid would be detrimental to the rehabilitative process
cutting against the purpose of the juvenile justice system. Vacating and remanding the lower
court’s decision, the court of appeals held that courts are authorized to consider a juvenile’s ability
to pay when setting the amount of restitution.
Silas v. State
In Silas v. State66 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that revoking an individual’s probation requires
a finding of good cause. Roy Silas was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor and
served a term of active imprisonment followed by 10 years of probation with a 5-year suspended
term of imprisonment. A condition of his probation was that he participate in a sex offender
treatment program as directed by his probation officer, and that he not discontinue the program
without approval from his probation officer. Silas participated in a program for more than a year,
until he was arrested for the theft of a computer. Following his release, he attempted to reenter the
program, but was terminated by the director for possessing pornographic videos, for failure to
abide by a curfew, and for unwillingness to fully engage in treatment. At his subsequent revocation
hearing, Silas contended that he did not “discontinue” his treatment, but rather that he was
terminated against his will and therefore did not violate the terms of his probation. The superior
court judge indicated that the reasons for Silas’s termination were irrelevant, and that his
termination alone was sufficient to show good cause for revocation. The appellate court reversed
and remanded, saying Pulusila v. State and Trumbly v. State require “good cause” for revocation
of probation, meaning the revoking court must find “the corrective aims of probation cannot be
achieved,” and that “continuation of probationary status would be at odds with the need to protect
society and society’s interest in the probationer’s rehabilitation.” Although the court stipulated that
involuntary termination could in some instances lead to a finding of good cause for revocation, the
lack of fact-finding in this case provided an insufficient record to resolve that question. The
appellate court held that the superior court should have determined whether the circumstances of
Silas’s termination from the program indicated that the probationary aims could not be met, or that
the continuation of probation would be contrary to protection of society and to Silas’s
rehabilitation.
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State v. Arredondo
In State v. Arredondo,67 the court of appeals held that (1) spousal communications must be
intended to remain confidential in order to be subject to spousal privilege, and (2) a defendant
waives marital communications privilege by using it to exclude information that he made
necessary to avoid a distortion of the fact-finding process. Police found Arredondo’s vehicle
abandoned next to a freeway exit. The primary issue at trial was whether Arredondo was the one
who wrecked the vehicle. As evidence, the state called Arredondo’s mother-in-law, McDole, to
testify about a conversation she had with her daughter, Jackie, about Arredondo shortly after the
accident. Jackie told McDole that Arredondo woke Jackie up and asked for help. Soon after, Jackie
arrived at the scene of the accident with a friend, but not Arredondo. At trial Arredondo attempted
to excluded evidence of his conversation with Jackie so that he could argue that Jackie knew where
the accident occurred because she caused it, not because Arredondo told her. On appeal,
Arredondo argued that he should be able to invoke the marital communications privilege to prevent
a third party from testifying about a conversation with his wife. The court of appeals affirmed the
lower court’s decision, reasoning that the marital communications privilege applies only to those
spousal communications intended to remain confidential, and Arredondo’s request for help was a
delegation of authority to Jackie to deal with third parties rather than a confidential
communication. The court further reasoned that because Arredondo attempted to use marital
privilege to exclude information that he made material to the fact-finding process by creating an
information gap, he waived the marital communications privilege. Affirming the lower court’s
decision, the court of appeals held that (1) spousal communications must be intended to remain
confidential in order to be subject to spousal privilege, and (2) a defendant waives marital
communications privilege by using it to exclude information that he made necessary to avoid a
distortion of the fact-finding process.
State v. Baker
In State v. Baker,68 the Court of Appeals held that criminal offenses arise out of the “same criminal
episode” for purposes of calculating a defendant’s speedy trial rights only when there is a close
elemental or evidentiary overlap between the charged offenses, or when the commission of one
criminal offense has a causal connection to another. Responding to a tip, an Alaska State Trooper
observed Timothy Baker operating a vehicle and conducting what appeared to be a drug deal at a
local gas station. The trooper approached Baker and requested his identification at which point
Baker ran, abandoning several small bags filled with a white powdery substance. After catching
Baker, the trooper determined Baker’s driver’s license was revoked. Baker was placed under arrest
and charged with driving with a revoked license. Baker was not charged with any drug-related
crimes at that time. Three months after the arrest Baker pled guilty to driving without a license.
In the interim, the State uncovered evidence that Baker was engaged in drug distribution and
confirmed that the white powder was in-fact cocaine. Approximately four months after Baker’s
initial arrest for driving with a revoked license, the State indicted him for possession of cocaine
with intent to sell. Baker moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the drug charge arose from
“the same criminal episode” as his prior arrest and that therefore the speedy trial time for the drug
charge started to run when he was charged for driving with a revoked license. The superior court
granted Baker’s motion to dismiss, finding that the two charges arose from the “same criminal
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episode” because Baker’s act of driving helped facilitate the drug deal. The court concluded that
the 120 speedy trial time had already passed and so it dismissed the felony drug indictment. The
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that there was no evidentiary,
elemental, or causal connection between the two otherwise separate criminal acts: driving without
a license and possession of cocaine. The appellate court explained that Baker’s driving played no
essential part in the drug offense as he could have easily walked to the site of the drug deal. It
further noted that Baker’s driving was irrelevant to the drug offense for evidentiary purposes and
that it was no essential element of the drug charge. The appellate court concluded that because the
only nexus between the two offenses was temporal and incidental the State could prosecute Baker
for the crime of driving with a revoked license without triggering Baker’s right to a speedy trial
on the drug offense. Reversing the lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeals held that criminal
offenses should be considered as arising out of the “same criminal episode” for purposes of
calculating a defendant’s speedy trial rights only when there is a close elemental or evidentiary
overlap between the charged offenses, or when the commission of one criminal offense has a causal
connection to another.
State v. Bell
In State v. Bell,69 the court of appeals held that section 12.55.027(d) of the Alaska Statutes requires
a defendant lose all credit toward their sentence for a period of release on bail subject to electronic
monitoring if it ends because the defendant commits a new crime. In 2015, section 12.55.027(d)
of the Alaska Statutes was amended to grant trial courts authority to count time on electronic
monitoring while on bail release against a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment provided,
amongst other conditions, that the defendant had not, “committed a criminal offense while under
electronic monitoring.” Robert Daniel Bell was convicted of second and third-degree theft. While
Bell was appealing his conviction he was granted bail and served three distinct periods on
electronic monitoring. Period I ended when Bell was taken into custody for allegedly violated the
terms of his release. Period II ended when Bell was arrested for third-degree theft to which he later
plead guilty. Period III ended when Bell’s appeal concluded. The superior court gave Bell credit
for all of the time he spent on electronic monitoring, with the exception of the day he was arrested,
ending Period II. All parties agreed Bell should get credit for Period III. The State argued that Bell
should not get any credit for Period II because he committed a crime while on electronic
monitoring. Bell responded that the trial court had statutory discretion to determine how much
credit would be lost because of a new offense. The court of appeals agreed with the State, reasoning
that Bell forfeited all credit for Period II when he committed a new crime. The court relied on a
broad consensus around this interpretation revealed in the legislative history of the statute. The
court of appeals decided to remand the question of Period I to the superior court for factual findings
as to whether Bell had actually violated the terms of his release, causing him to lose credit for that
period. Affirming, reversing, and vacating the superior court in part, the court of appeals held that
a defendant loses all credit for a period of electronic monitoring when they commit a new offense.
State v. Groppel
In State v. Groppel,70 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that experts appointed under section
12.47.070 of the Alaska Statutes are the court’s experts, that the superior court must appoint
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qualified experts from the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) unless there is a legitimate reason not
to, and that if it appoints non-API experts, the court system must bear their costs. If a defendant’s
mental capacity is in issue, section 12.47.070 of the Alaska Statutes directs the court to appoint at
least two qualified psychiatrists or psychologists certified by the American Board of Forensic
Psychology to determine the mental condition of the defendant. Groppel was charged with first
and second-degree murder, along with a plethora of other charges, and subsequently notified the
court that he might rely on a diminished capacity defense. The superior court discovered that API
did not have any psychiatrists statutorily qualified to conduct the examination. The superior court
therefore ruled that it would appoint two non-API statutorily qualified experts, one for each party,
and that each party was to bear the cost of its own expert. Both the State and Groppel appealed.
The Alaska Supreme Court found that legislative history revealed the legislature intended to
provide non-partisan experts and that the Model Penal Code further supported that conclusion. It
also determined that trial courts have historically appointed API to perform the psychiatric
evaluations and that that historical practice was sound. Further, it reasoned that because experts
appointed under section 12.47.070 of the Alaska Statutes are supervised by and report directly to
the court they are the court’s experts and must be funded by it if not from API. Vacating the
superior court’s order, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that experts appointed under section
12.47.070 of the Alaska Statutes are the court’s experts, that the superior court must appoint
qualified experts from API unless there is a legitimate reason not to, and that if the court appoints
non-API experts, the court system must bear their costs.
State v. Ranstead
In State v. Ranstead,71 the supreme court held that a sentencing court need not make particularized
findings to support uncontested conditions of probation, and that a defendant must object to a
proposed condition of probation to preserve it for appeal. Defendant Ranstead plead guilty to
second-degree sexual assault. His presentence report recommended imprisonment followed by
probation with 11 general conditions and 26 special conditions. Ranstead objected to 10
conditions. The superior court overruled his objections and imposed all recommendations. In doing
so it did not make findings as to the uncontested conditions though it reviewed the record. Ranstead
appealed, challenging a general condition he had not objected to in the superior court, as well as
10 special conditions, one of which he had also not objected to in the superior court. The court of
appeals rejected Ranstead’s challenge to the general condition, but it vacated the ten special
conditions, and struck down two more that Ranstead had not objected to or challenged on appeal.
Finally, it vacated all remaining conditions, even though Ranstead had not objected to them or
raised them on appeal either. In doing so, the court of appeals relied on Beasley v. State, which
precluded a sentencing judge from adopting conditions proposed in the presentence report without
reviewing them critically. The supreme court reversed, holding that a superior court need not make
findings as to the uncontested probation conditions. It emphasized that nothing in the Alaska Rules
of Criminal Procedure, particularly Rule 32, requires a court to do such, and that counsels’ role in
calling attention to proposed conditions is integral to assisting a trial court in imposing a sentence.
As to preserving issues for appeal, the court did not deem it necessary to depart from the procedural
principle that a party forfeits its right to appeal an issue when the party fails to timely object to it.
The court highlighted the importance of the rule in focusing litigation at the trial level, and the role
this principle plays in developing a robust record for appellate review. The supreme court therefore
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overruled Beasley, reversing the court of appeals’ decision to vacate conditions to which Ranstead
did not object, holding that: (1) the superior court need not affirmatively review uncontested
conditions of probation; and (2) the defendant must object to probation conditions at the superior
court level, or else he forfeits his right to appeal those issues.
State v. Thompson
In State v. Thompson,72 the court of appeals held that bail violations during a certain period were
not per se criminal offenses and so do not disqualify defendants from getting credit for time served
while under electronic monitoring. In February 2016, Thompson was arrested for driving under
the influence and released on pre-trial bail with electronic monitoring. In July of 206, while being
monitored, Thompson allegedly violated his bail conditions by consuming alcohol and testing
positive for several illicit substances. Thompson eventually plead guilty to several charges and at
sentencing requested the superior court give him credit for time served on electronic monitoring,
the state opposed this. Under 12.55.027 of the Alaska Statutes, trial courts have the authority to
grant credit to a defendant for time served while released on bail subject to electronic monitoring,
provided the person has not committed a criminal offense while being monitored. Between July
2016 and November 2017, the violation of a bail condition was not a crime in Alaska. Because of
this, the superior court held that Thompson was still eligible to receive credit for time served
because his bail violations were non-criminal; the state appealed. The court of appeals affirmed
applying Alaska’s sliding scale approach to statutory interpretation that eschews reliance on just
the plain meaning. The court of appeals explained that before November 2017, the statute’s later
legislative history reflected a desire make bail violations civil violations rather than criminal
misdemeanors, even if earlier legislative history had indicated a desire for bail violations to
constitute a crime. As the legislative history was susceptible to two reasonably constructions, the
court of appeals determined that the plain meaning of the statutory text controls. The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that non-criminal bail violations were not considered criminal offenses
between July 2016 and November 2017, and therefore bail violations during that period do not
disqualify defendants from getting credit for time served on bail while under electronic monitoring.
Tanner v. State
In Tanner v. State,73 the court of appeals held that an Alaska Statute,74 governing credit for time
served while subject to electronic monitoring, did not authorize credit to be awarded if a person is
allowed to go grocery shopping because grocery shopping is not an implicitly authorized exception
to the statute’s required restraints, and it also does not qualify as a rehabilitative activity.75 After
serving time in prison, Tanner was placed on probation. But when his probation was revoked, and
he was subsequently released on bail, Tanner was subjected to electronic monitoring. The terms
of his contract with the monitoring company, adopted by the court, allowed Tanner to leave home
for a variety of reasons, including grocery shopping. Tanner eventually filed a motion seeking
credit for the 212 days he served subject to electronic monitoring. The superior court denied his
motion because the electronic monitoring agreement allowed Tanner to go grocery shopping,
finding this was not sufficiently restrictive to satisfy the statutory requirements for awarding time
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served. Tanner appealed arguing that because grocery shopping is an essential activity the statute
should be construed to implicitly authorize it, or that in the alternative it constituted “rehabilitative
activity” which is explicitly authorized by the statute. The court of appeals affirmed the ruling of
the superior court, reasoning that while it would be reasonable for the legislature to allow for
occasional grocery shopping, it was not ridiculous to distinguish it from activities that the statute
chose to authorize. The court noted that unlike the statute’s other exceptions, in which a separate
party would notice if the defendant failed to show up, no one would notice if the defendant did not
actually go grocery shopping when he claimed to do so. Further, the court reasoned that grocery
shopping does not qualify as attending a rehabilitative activity, as grocery shopping does not
normally fit into a plain understanding of “rehabilitation,” and one does not normally “attend” a
grocery trip. In affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that an Alaska Statute,
governing credit for time served while subject to electronic monitoring, did not authorize credit to
be awarded if a person is allowed to go grocery shopping because grocery shopping is not an
implicitly authorized exception to the statute’s required restraints, and it also does not qualify as a
rehabilitative activity.
Thomas v. State
In Thomas v. State,76 the court of appeals held that a sentencing judge must engage in case-specific
analysis of the circumstances and facts of the specific case and the particular defendant when
determining a need for a special restriction on the defendant’s eligibility for discretionary parole.
Thomas pled guilty to second-degree murder for the death of his girlfriend and agreed to receive
a sentence of 75 years imprisonment with 25 years suspended (50 years to serve). The superior
court judge rejected the negotiated sentence as too lenient, but did not provide specific reasons to
support the decision. Instead, the superior court judge made broad statements regarding individuals
convicted of murder and their general eligibility for parole. Thomas and the State appealed and
argued that the superior court failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the negotiated
sentence. The court of appeals held that a judge cannot impose a more severe parole restriction on
a defendant solely because it believes that the discretionary parole statutes are not sufficiently
harsh for the category of crime the defendant committed. It explained that since discretionary
parole is difficult to obtain, a sentencing judge cannot consider the defendant’s eligibility for
discretionary parole as a factor likely to reduce the jail time that the defendant will serve. Vacating
the superior court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a sentencing judge must engage in casespecific analysis of the circumstances and facts of the particular case and the specific defendant
when determining a need for a special restriction on the defendant’s eligibility for discretionary
parole.
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ELECTION LAW
Mallot v. Stand for Salmon
In Mallott v. Stand for Salmon,77 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a ballot initiative effects an
unconstitutional appropriation if it transfers state assets into private hand or if it infringes on the
legislature’s ability to allocate resources among competing use. In July 2017, Stand for Salmon
submitted ballot initiative 17FSH2 to establish a permitting scheme for projects affecting
anadromous fish habitats. The governor declined to certify it concluding portions of it improperly
constrained legislative authority to allocate state resources. Stand for Salmon sued and won an
injunction to circulate the initiative, arguing it did not infringe on the legislature’s authority
because, though it prohibited some activities, the legislature retained discretion in how to
implement the measure. On appeal the supreme court first highlighted article XI, section 7 of the
Alaska Constitution, under which “‘[t]he initiative shall not be used to . . . make or repeal
appropriations.’”78 Reviewing the legal precedent, the court identified two ways in which a ballot
initiative could create an unconstitutional appropriation:
An initiative is an impermissible give-away program if it transfers state
assets into private hands. An initiative also effects an appropriation if it
infringes on the legislature’s ability to allocate resources among competing
uses—that is, if it fails “to ensure that the legislature, and only the
legislature, retains control over the allocation of state assets among
competing needs”—by forcing the legislature to make a particular
allocation decision in the future or by removing certain allocation decisions
from the legislature’s range of discretion.79
Applying this standard to the initiative, the court noted restrictive language that allowed
the commissioner to issue a major permit only if the activity would not cause
substantial damage to the fish habitat. Finding that this “would completely prevent
the legislature from permitting projects that result in the permanent destruction of
anadromous fish habitat,” the court conclude the initiative was an unconstitutional
appropriation.80 Instead of declaring the entire initiative unconstitutional, the court
chose to sever the offending language, proposed AS 16.05.885(e)(3) and the third
sentence of proposed AS 16.05.887(a). Reversing and remanded to place the amended
initiative on the ballot, the court held that a ballot initiative effects an unconstitutional
appropriation if it transfers state assets into private hand or if it infringes on the
legislature’s ability to allocate resources among competing uses.
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Marcy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough
In Marcy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough,81 the supreme court held that the public interest in
reviewing a suit similar to other potential upcoming litigation did not override the claim’s
mootness. In 2014, Alaska passed a statewide ballot initiative to legalize marijuana, enacting
section 17.38 of the Alaska Statutes. It legalized marijuana, but allows local governments to
“prohibit the operation of marijuana cultivation facilities, marijuana product manufacturing
facilities, marijuana testing facilities, or retail marijuana stores through the enactment of an
ordinance or by a voter initiative.” Shortly after the law went into effect, a municipal initiative
petition titled “Application for Ballot Initiative to Prohibit Marijuana Business Except Those
Involving Industrial Hemp in the Matanuska-Susitna Borough” (the Proposed Initiative) was
certified for the October 2016 local ballot. Ronda Marcy, a Borough resident who had purchased
and outfitted greenhouses to open a marijuana business after passage of section 17.38, filed a
complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief 32 days prior to the October election. In
late September, the superior court ordered the case held in abeyance pending the election,
explaining that absentee voting had already begun, making relief before the election “inherently
disruptive and prejudicial to the ordinary voting process.” After the Proposed Initiative was
rejected in the election, Marcy’s moved to stay the execution of judgment, but the court denied her
motion finding the issue moot, and dismissed the case without findings of fact or conclusions of
law. Marcy appealed on several grounds. The supreme court held that the lower court’s abeyance
order, issuance of notice of intent to dismiss the case as moot, and dismissal without findings of
fact and conclusions of law were not abuses of discretion. In considering Marcy’s assertion that
the public interest exception override the mootness issue, the court evaluated three issues: “(1)
whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition, (2) whether the mootness doctrine, if applied
may repeatedly circumvent review of the issues, and (3) whether the issues presented are so
important to the public interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine.” The court dismissed
Marcy’s argument that review would prevent needless litigation repetition over similar initiatives,
finding that that an opinion on such similar initiatives’ constitutionality would be purely advisory
and potentially inapplicable because they were not actually before the court. Preferring to wait for
a challenge to one of the proposed or actual laws grounded in facts and therefore avoiding
unintended consequences, the court held that the public interest in preventing the opening of a
litigation floodgate was not persuasive enough to require review of Marcy’s moot constitutional
and statutory claims.
Nageak v. Mallott
In Nageak v. Mallott,82 the Supreme Court held that (1) election challengers must bring an election
contest complaint, rather than a recount appeal, if they are alleging only misconduct, fraud, or
corruption in the conduct of an election, and (2) the misconduct must be sufficient to change the
result of the election before a new election will be ordered. After a recount Dean Westlake
defeated Benjamin Nageak for the Alaska Democratic Party’s nomination for representative of
Alaska House District 40 in the 2016 primary election by eight votes. Nageak filed an election
contest complaint, asserting that, among other errors, various election officials erred by giving 50
voters both the ADL and Republican ballots in violation of the rules of each party. Per these rules,
registered Alaskan Independence, Democratic, and Libertarian voters may vote only on the “ADL”
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ballot, and Republican, Undeclared, and Non-Partisan voters may choose to vote either the ADL
or the Republican ballot. The trial court found this error changed the results of the election and so
it certified Nageak the winner; on appeal the supreme court disagreed. The supreme court first
explained that a claim is properly brought as an election contest complaint rather than as a recount
appeal when the underlying issue is misconduct, typically by election officials, rather than a
disagreement over vote counting. It then reasoned that a new election should only be ordered if a
challenger has shown sufficient misconduct to change the result with every reasonable
presumption in favor of the validity of the election. The court found that the election error was
the result of misconduct, but was not enough to change the results of the election as Westlake won
by eight votes. Consequently, it concluded that the misconduct was not sufficient to trigger a new
election. Reversing the trial court and reinstating Westlake as the winner, the supreme court held
that (1) election challengers must bring an election contest case, rather than a recount appeal, if
they are alleging only misconduct, fraud, or corruption by an election official, and (2) election
officials’ misconduct must be sufficient to change the result of the election before a new election
will be ordered.
State v. Alaska Democratic Party
In State v. Alaska Democratic Party,83 the supreme court held the Alaska Constitution’s right of
free association allows a political party to open its primaries to registered independent candidates.
Alaska requires candidates to either win a party primary or secure a certain number of petition
signatures to appear on the general election ballot. In order to run in a primary, a candidate must
meet certain qualifications, one of which is the “party affiliation rule,” which requires that a
candidate be registered as a member of the party from which he or she seeks nomination. The
Democratic Party amended its bylaws to allow registered independents to run in its primaries. The
State Division of Elections refused to allow these candidacies because they violated the party
affiliation rule, prompting a constitutional challenge by the party. The superior court granted the
Democratic Party’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the party had an associational
right to allow independent primary candidates. The supreme court affirmed, finding the party
affiliation rule violated Alaska’s right of free association in pursuit of political goals provided to
both individuals and political parties by article 1, section 5 of Alaska’s constitution. The court
initially determined that a party’s associational rights include the right to choose its general
election candidates regardless of their party registration. It explained that because that the party
affiliation rule prevents a party from determining the “ideological caste” of its candidates, the rule
imposes a substantial burden on the right of association. The court noted that while this burden is
only moderate under the federal constitution, Alaska’s constitution is more protective. The court
explained that because the rule imposes a substantial burden it may only be justified if it serves a
sufficiently compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to that interest. It determined that the rule
did not advance the state’s interest in confirming public support exists for the party and similarly
was not necessary to ensure the stability of the political system, or to prevent confusion. Finally,
the court further found the rule was not narrowly tailored to advance theses interests. Affirming
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held the Alaska Constitution’s right of free
association allows a political party to open its primaries to registered independent candidates.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW
Alaska State Comm’n for Human Rights v. Anderson
In Alaska State Comm’n for Human Rights v. Anderson,84 the supreme court held that a statute
mandating confidentiality in investigations permits an agency to exclude third-parties from
investigative interviews. An employee of Alaska’s Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) filed a discrimination complaint with the Commission for Human Rights, which enforces
Alaska’s anti-discrimination laws. The Commission subpoenaed the employee’s supervisor, Dori
Anderson, as part of its investigation of the complaint under section 18.80.115 of the Alaska
Statutes. Anderson refused to comply unless DHHS’s Equal Opportunity Employment Manager,
Greta Jones, was present for “support.” The investigator, Patricia Watts, explained multiple times
that Jones could not be present as this violated the Commission’s unwritten policy of excluding
third parties from investigative interviews, with limited exceptions, to maintain confidentiality.
She also warned Anderson that refusal could result in contempt proceedings. Nonetheless,
Anderson refused to be interviewed and so the Commission initiated contempt proceedings against
her. Anderson moved to dismiss, and the superior court granted her motion. It concluded that the
Commission lacked authority to require Anderson appear alone pursuant to an unwritten policy
because § 18.80.115 did not explicitly grant this authority unlike some other statutes. On appeal,
the supreme court reversed the superior court’s order, finding the statute implicitly authorized
exclusion of third parties at interviews. The court focused on the statute’s requirement that
investigations be confidential both to the public and to the respondent. It explained that this
purpose would be frustrated, and that a witness’s candor could be chilled, by allowing the presence
of third parties. Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that a statute mandating
confidentiality in investigations permits an agency to exclude third-parties from investigative
interviews.
Atkins v. Intel Transportation & Taxi Service, Inc.
In Atkins v. Intel Transportation & Taxi Service, Inc.,85 the supreme court held a claimant who
fails to obtain written approval from his employer or the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Benefits
Guaranty Fund (“The Fund”) before settling a personal-injury claim against a third party, as
required by Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act, cannot seek workers’ compensation. In 2009,
Atkins, a taxi driver, was in route to pick up a customer when another car hit his taxi head on. The
driver of the other car was killed and Atkins was severely injured. Soon after the accident, Atkins
obtained an attorney to investigate possible sources of compensation, including through tort suit
and claims under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act (“The Act”). For a variety of reasons,
the workers’ compensation claim was delayed while Atkins sued the estate of the other driver,
which ultimately led to a policy-limited settlement against the estate’s automobile insurance.
Critically, Atkins did not receive written approval from his alleged employer, Inlet, or the Fund,
for the settlement before accepting it; approval is required under the Act in order to receiver
workers’ compensation. As a result, the Workers’ Compensation Board (“The Board”) dismissed
Atkins’ claim because he had not obtained the written approval of the Fund or his employer before
the settlement. Atkins appealed arguing his employer’s approval was not necessary because (1)
the settlement was not a “compromise” under the act, and (2) the settlement did not prejudice his
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employer. The supreme court reject his arguments. First, relying on Black’s Law Diction, the
court held that an agreement between two parties constitutes a “compromise” for purposes of the
Act, and so Atkins’ settlement was a compromise. Next, the court concluded that even though
Atkins’ settlement did not prejudice his employer or the Fund, allowing his claim would violate
the clear command of the statute and undermine its protections. The court explained that by
settling before a judicial decision was reached Atkins’ had violated this clear rule and risked
prejudice even though prejudice did not actually result. Additionally, the court distinguished past
exceptions to this rule as the result of independent judicial determinations after a trial, not
settlements at a third-party’s policy limit beforehand. Ultimately, affirming the result below, the
supreme court held a claimant who fails to obtain written approval from his employer or the Fund
before settling a personal-injury claim cannot seek claims for workers compensations even when
the failure of the claimant to get prior approval does not prejudice the employer or the Fund.
Burke v. Raven Electric, Inc.
In Burke v. Raven Electric, Inc.86 the court held that the exclusive remedy provision of the
Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) (1) does not violate the due process or equal protection
clauses and (2) bars relief under the Defective Machinery Act. The mother of an employee killed
at work sought workers’ compensation death benefits, arguing that the Act was unconstitutional
because it did not sufficiently compensate the loss her daughter’s life, and because it failed to
account for the mother’s future dependency on her daughter. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation
Board denied the claim, and the Appeals Commission affirmed the decision and ordered the mother
to pay for the employer’s attorney’s fees. Affirming the Appeals Commission’s decision, the
supreme court rejected the claim that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision violates the due process
and equal protection clauses. It explained this provision bars parents from bringing suit “on
account of [an] injury or death” covered by the Act, and that parents are only entitled to benefits
under the Act itself if they are dependent on the child at the time of the child’s death. The court
concluded that because the mother was not dependent at the time of her daughter’s death, she
lacked a substantive due process right under the Act. Further, the court dismissed the argument
that the Act violates the equal protection clause. It explained that parents who currently depend on
their children for income are differently situated from those who might later depend on their
children, so the two groups may be treated differently. Additionally, the court declined to overturn
its precedent which had held that the Defective Machinery Act only applies to occupations not
covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act, thereby barring the mother from suing under the
Defective Machinery Act. Finally, the court reversed the award of attorney’s fees to the employer,
reasoning that because the mother was self-represented, and because only the court had jurisdiction
to decide the constitutional questions, the appeal was neither unreasonable nor frivolous.
Otherwise affirming the judgment below, the court held that the exclusive remedy provision of the
Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) (1) does not violate the due process or equal protection
clauses and (2) bars relief under the Defective Machinery Act.
Kang v. Mullins
In Kang v. Mullins87 the supreme court reversed the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Commission, deciding that a woman was not her neighbor’s employer when she hired him to
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complete repairs on a home she rented to use as a residence and place of business. Yong Kang
rented a home in North Pole from her son. She lived in the home and used it to operate her business,
Lee’s Massage. In early 2015, Kang hired her neighbor Alexander Mullins to repair the home’s
roof. As the work progressed, it became clear that the house also needed to be leveled, and Mullins
agreed to take on that job as well. Mullins injured his wrist while working on the leveling project.
Soon after, he had a dispute with Kang about compensation and stopped working on the house.
When Mullins went to the emergency room for treatment on his wrist, he filed a report of injury
with the Workers’ Compensation Board, listing Lee’s Massage as his employer. After a hearing,
the board found that Lee’s Massage was Mullins’ employer and required the business to
compensate him. On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the
board’s decision, finding that based on the “totality of the circumstances” Mullins was employed
by Lee’s Massage “in connection with a business or industry.” Reviewing the commission’s
decision, the supreme court chose not to focus on the nature of the agreement between Kang and
Mullins, opting to analyze Kang’s role as a tenant at the property. Because Kang was a tenant,
neither she nor her business was obligated to arrange for the repairs to the home that Mullins
performed. The supreme court emphasized that Kang was therefore a consumer of rental and repair
services, not a producer. Relying on this distinction, the supreme court found that Mullins had not
proved he entered into an employment contract with Lee’s Massage. Reversing the commission,
the supreme court held that for purposes of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act, a person or
entity is not an employer when they hire someone in their capacity as a consumer rather than in
connection with their business.
Moody v. Lodge
In Moody v. Lodge,88 the Alaska Supreme Court held that whether time not spent actively
performing duties should be counted towards overtime under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act
(AWHA) is determined by applying the standard of Hutka v. Sisters of Providence in Washington.
From 2002 to 2007, Jeff Moody worked as a pilot for Royal Wolf Lodge. While working at the
lodge he resided there, waiting to be called to his duties. In 2008, Moody sued the lodge seeking
unpaid overtime under AWHA. The superior court found that when not actively carrying out his
duties Moody was “waiting to be engaged,” rather than “engaged to wait” and was therefore only
entitled to 6.4 hours of overtime. The supreme court affirmed. It explained that because the
AWHA mandates overtime pay if an employee works over eight hours in a day, the analysis of
whether overtime pay is owed centers on how much time was spent “‘actually working.’” The
supreme court concluded that the superior court had correctly assessed this by applying the
standard from Hutka: “‘(1) the degree to which the employee is free to engage in personal
activities; and (2) the agreements between the parties.’” Noting that no agreement appeared to
exist, the supreme court explained it was proper for the superior court to use the non-exhaustive
list of illustrative factors from Owens v. Local No. 169, Association of Western Pulp & Paper
Workers to determine how free Moody had been when not actively performing his duties. As the
superior court’s factual findings were not challenged, the supreme court held that the lower court
had appropriately applied the facts to the tests delineated in Hutka and Owens. Affirming, the
supreme court held that whether time not spent actively performing duties should be counted
towards overtime under the AWHA is determined by applying the standard of Hutka.
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Public Safety Employees Ass’n, AFSCME Local 803, AFL-CIO v. City of Fairbanks
In Public Safety Employees Ass’n, AFSCME Local 803, AFL-CIO v. City of Fairbanks,89 the
supreme court held that a city council’s politically motivated rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement is not a violation of Alaska’s Public Employer Relations Act (the Act). In 2013, the
City of Fairbanks began negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement with the Public Safety
Employees Association (PSEA). The mayor negotiated an agreement which received tentative
approval by the city council. In August 2014, after public input, the agreement was formally
passed, but a council member filed a notice of reconsideration. The notice was initially rejected as
untimely, but at the next council meeting the rules were suspended to allow for reconsideration.
After reconsideration, where a number of constituents voiced concerns about the city’s ability to
pay, the council unanimously rejected the agreement. PSEA filed a charge with the Alaska Labor
Relations Agency (ALRA), alleging that the council had not bargained in good faith. The union
further argued that the suspension of the rules and reconsideration of the agreement was an unfair
labor practice. An ALRA panel found that the council had acted in bad faith by “stringing out”
negotiations, and a superior court affirmed this result. On appeal, the supreme court reasoned the
council had acted within its procedures to reconsider and ultimately reject the agreement. Further,
the supreme court concluded that there was no evidence of intent to “string out” negotiations in
bad faith. The court reached this conclusion based on four considerations: 1) the council’s
directives in the bargaining process were tentative, 2) the council was unaware of higher cost
estimates when it tentatively approved parts of the agreement, 3) there was no evidence the council
voted to reconsider based on any consideration other than finances, and 4) there was no evidence
the council postponed for any reason other than reassessment. The supreme court found that the
council voted to reject the agreement based on the political process alone; the court explained that
without more this does not evidence a lack of “present intention to find a basis for agreement,”
and therefore no violation of the Act occurred. Reversing the superior court’s decision in favor of
PSEA, the supreme court held that a city council’s politically motivated rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement is not a violation of Alaska’s Public Employer Relations Act.
Sleeper v. URS Midwest
In Sleeper v. URS Midwest,90 the district court held that the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA)
is not preempted by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Sleeper was employed by URS as a
truck driver. Sleeper claimed that during his employment, URS failed to pay him overtime and
illegally deducted pay he earned. As part of their defense, URS asserted that Sleeper’s claim under
the state law AWHA was preempted by the federal law FLSA. Rejecting this claim, the district
court explained that they were bound by Ninth Circuit precedent holding otherwise. The court
reasoned that creating an exception to the Ninth Circuit’s holding was unwarranted because the
record keeping requirements of the AWHA are not inconsistent, and therefore not preempted, by
a federal statute which serves the purpose of promoting highway safety. Finally, the court reasoned
that no other provision of the AWHA was in direct conflict with the FLSA or otherwise an obstacle
to Congressional intent. Consequently, the district court held that the AWHA is not preempted by
the FLSA.
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
League of Conservation Voters v. Trump
In League of Conservation Voters v. Trump,91 the district court held that the potential harm to the
oceans from an executive order was sufficiently imminent, geographically specific, and
particularized to establish standing under Article III. Using power granted by Congress in the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), President Obama withdrew 128 million acres of the
Arctic and Atlantic Oceans from future oil and gas leasing over the course of 2015 and 2016. In
April 2017, President Trump issued an executive order reversing these decisions. The League of
Conservation Voters, and others, sued the President and members of his administration, claiming
they lacked statutory authority to reverse the withdrawal. The Defendants moved to dismiss on
grounds of sovereign immunity, the Plaintiffs’ lack of a private right of action, the inability of the
court to issue declaratory relief against the President, and the Plaintiffs’ lack of Article III standing.
The district court rejected all grounds for dismissal, focusing particularly on the question of
standing under Article III. It rejected the sovereign immunity argument on the basis of precedential
exceptions for officers unconstitutional actions taken in the sovereign’s name or in excess of
statutory authority. It also rejected the need for a statutorily authorized cause of action because
Plaintiffs’ suit challenged action in excess of the President’s constitutional or statutory authority
rather than for enforcement of a federal law. The district court sidestepped the questionable
constitutionality of an injunction against the president on the grounds that the Plaintiffs ultimately
sought an injunction against subordinate officials, not the President. With respect to Article III
standing, the district court concluded that the Plaintiffs were able to demonstrate injury in fact by
establishing imminent harm, geographic specificity of the threat, and particularity of harm. It
determined that the alleged threat of harm to ocean wildlife from seismic research was imminent
based on the government’s clear intent to expedite energy production and the oil industry’s
eagerness to pursue this production. Despite the large area covered by the suit, because it was
discrete and defined, the court concluded the threat was geographically specific. And Plaintiffs’
loss of enjoyment of the wildlife in these areas established the particularity of harm. In rejecting
the motions to dismiss, the district court held that the potential harm to the oceans was sufficiently
imminent, geographically specific, and particularized to establish standing under Article III and
allowed the lawsuit to proceed.
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EVIDENCE LAW
Wassillie v. State
In Wassillie v. State,92 the supreme court held that an incident report prepared by a staff member
at a halfway house was inadmissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
Wassillie, who was serving out the remainder of a felony sentence at the Parkview Center halfway
house, was found guilty of second-degree escape. His indictment was based on an incident report
prepared by a staff member that relayed the statements of another resident. Wassillie appealed,
arguing that the incident report was inadmissible hearsay, and without it the evidence was
insufficient to support his indictment. The state argued that the incident report was admissible
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court concluded that the
incident report was not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
Business records are exempt from the hearsay rule because they typically reflect the routine
operations of a business. To qualify for this exemption, the record must be of a regularly conducted
business activity, must be regularly kept, the source must have personal knowledge, the
information must have been recorded contemporaneously, and foundation testimony must be
provided. The court found that this incident report was not prepared as part of a regularly
conducted business activity and was prepared in anticipation of litigation, undermining its
trustworthiness. The court analogized this incident report to investigative reports prepared by a
participant or observer to an incident, such as a police report, which are less objective and are
ordinarily inadmissible. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the incident report was
inadmissible under the business records exception.
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FAMILY LAW
Brennan v. Brennan
In Brennan v. Brennan,93 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that to determine whether separate
property has been transmuted into marital property through an implied inter-spousal gift, a court
must determine whether the owning spouse intended “to donate or convey separate property to the
marital unit or marital estate.” Kelly Brennan formed a fishing business with his first wife Mary.
Through his work, he acquired Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs) from the federal government to
harvest halibut and sablefish. Following Kelly’s divorce from Mary, he married Rachael in July
1994. Kelly and Rachael filed for divorce in May 2012, and the two disputed their contributions
to the fishing business. Supposedly, Kelly fished and maintained the vessel, while Rachael ran
errands for the business, cleaned the boat, and engaged in bookkeeping for almost 20 years. The
superior court found that the IFQs were all acquired through work performed before Kelly married
Rachael, so they constituted separate property when Kelly entered into the marriage. However,
considering that Kelly made payments for the IFQs to his ex-wife Mary using marital income from
the business and sold several IFQs to pay for his marital home with Rachael, the superior court
found that after the marriage Kelly and Rachael had together transmuted the IFQs into marital
property by exhibiting “intent” to treat them as such. Kelly appealed challenging both the superior
court’s finding of facts and its application of law on this issue. The Supreme Court of Alaska
found that the payments to Marry and toward the marital home were irrelevant and held that only
the owning spouse’s intent is relevant to determining whether a transmutation has occurred through
an implied inter-spousal gift. The Court explained that in order to consider the non-owning
spouse’s intent, “the non-owning spouse’s participating must be significant and evidence an intent
to operate jointly.” The court concluded that though the superior court found that Rachael had
such an intent, and had made a “significant” contribution, the court failed to analyze whether Kelly,
the separate owner, had such an intent to operate the business jointly. Reversing and remanding
for reconsideration of the issue, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that in order to determine
whether separate property may “transmute” into marital property through an implied inter-spousal
gift, the court must determine whether the owning spouse intended “to donate or convey separate
property to the marital unit or marital estate.”
Dara S. v. State
In Dara S. v. State,94 the supreme court held that a court may set aside a termination of parental
rights order where there is clear and convincing evidence both that the parent is sufficiently
rehabilitated and that the parent is capable of providing the care and guidance that wills serve the
moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the child. Paxton, son of Dara S., was born with
serious kidney problems requiring extensive medical care. Shortly after her son’s birth, Dara
sought mental health counseling for depression, and was subsequently diagnosed with various
mental health disorders requiring medication. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed for
emergency custody of Paxton after Dara was hospitalized for a possible suicide attempt and later
diagnosed with psychosis brought on by her medications. Over the next couple of years, Dara
underwent treatment and worked toward regaining custody of Paxton. Two and a half years after
the emergency removal, OCS’s petition to terminate Dara’s parental rights was granted. After the
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oral termination decision but prior to the written termination order, Dara moved for a review
hearing. Following the review hearing, the judge reinstated Dara’s parental rights, which OSC
appealed. The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s termination order, holding that the
lower court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, and that all the necessary findings required for
the termination of parental rights were made. The court then affirmed the validity of relevant
caselaw, including Rita T. v. State,95 which established a limited opportunity to reinstate parental
rights post-termination.96 The court concluded that although statutory law was amended since the
Rita T. decision, the replacement of “review hearings” with “permanency hearings” did not prevent
parents from applying, with good cause shown, for a hearing regarding disposition orders, as was
done under the previous law.97 The court rejected the argument that Rita T. hearings do not have
a statutory basis, holding that such hearings fit within the statutory framework allowing courts to
stay, grant a new hearing, modify, or set aside any order or judgment entered in a Child In Need
of Aid matter. Finally, the court determined that in a Rita T. hearing, a parent must show by clear
and convincing evidence that reinstatement is in the best interests of the child and that the parent
“is rehabilitated and [] is currently capable of providing the care and guidance that will serve the
moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the child.” Concluding that it lacked a sufficient
record to determine Paxton’s best interests, the court affirmed the initial termination of Dara’s
parental rights and remanded for further findings holding that that a court may set aside a
termination of parental rights order where there is clear and convincing evidence both that the
parent is sufficiently rehabilitated and that the parent is capable of providing the care and guidance
that wills serve the moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the child.
Dean S. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Dean S. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services,98 the supreme court held that a superior
court’s procedurally proper denial of a motion to withdraw consent to adoption will not be
overturned absent clear error established by a “definite impression” of factual error in the record.
Dean and Emily S. were investigated by the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) over a sevenyear period for mostly unsubstantiated claims of substance abuse and neglect; OCS took custody
over their children twice in that period. Ultimately, OCS sought termination of their parental rights,
and both parents executed valid consents to adoption by Dean’s sister. Dean subsequently moved
to withdraw his consent, claiming a desire for full custody and arguing that he had worked to
improve himself as a parent. Applying the best interests of the child standard, the superior court
denied Dean’s motion, relying on the OCS caseworker’s testimony that the children were thriving
in Dean’s sister’s custody. The supreme court held that where the record does not show a clear
factual error by the superior court, the superior court’s decision to deny a motion for withdrawal
of consent to adoption will not be overturned. The supreme court explained that ten days after
consent to adoption is given, section 25.23.070 of the Alaska Statutes only allows it to be
withdrawn if doing so is in the best interest of the child as determined by a hearing including the
petitioner, the person seeking withdrawal, and the agency placing the child up for adoption. The
supreme court determined that the record did not give a “definite impression” that the superior
court’s conclusion was in error as Dean’s testimony could be understood to say that withdrawing
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consent was in his best interest, not the children’s. Affirming the superior court, the supreme court
held that a superior court decision to deny a motion to withdraw consent to adoption will not be
overturned absent clear error established by a “definite impression” of factual error in the record.
Diego K. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Diego K. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services,99 the supreme court held that, when a court
is making factual findings and legal conclusions in a child in need of aid (CINA) hearing, it is error
to rely upon substantial information not in evidence. Between March 2014 and April 2016, a series
of status and removal hearings were held regarding a teenager named Mary, who was an Indian
child as defined by the Indian Child’s Welfare Act (ICWA). During these hearings, testimony was
offered regarding Mary’s living conditions, family affairs, school attendance, and behavioral
issues. Based on this information, the superior court ordered Mary to be removed from her parents’
custody. On appeal, the parents argued that it was reversible error for the superior court to consider
unsworn statements due to the requirements of CINA Rule 3(h) and Alaska Evidence Rule 603.
The supreme court agreed, reasoning that child custody cases such as Mary’s involve issues of
fundamental importance which deserve great care. The court further reasoned that the parents’
lacked notice and opportunity to be heard, as they were denied the opportunity to object to the
unsworn statements. Remanding the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that, when
a court is making factual findings and legal conclusions in a CINA hearing, it is error to rely upon
substantial information not in evidence.
Dunmore v. Dunmore
In Dunmore v. Dunmore100, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that while a court cannot lawfully
divide social security benefits belonging to either spouse, courts have discretion to consider them
as evidence of the parties’ respective financial positions when equitably dividing marital property.
Gloria and Richard Dunmore were married in 1975, separated in July 2007, and Richard filed for
divorce in July of 2015. At the time of the trial to divide their property, Richard was nearly 64 and
Gloria was 61. Richard received Veterans Administration (VA) disability benefits of $133 per
month, Social Security disability benefits of $2,081 per month, and a Federal Employees
Retirement System (FERS) pension of approximately $360 per month. Gloria received $5,762 in
monthly benefits from the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). The superior court
equally divided the parties’ pensions and the benefits from the FERS and PERS plans for the dates
between their marriage and separation. The superior court noted that it had not considered the
parties’ Social Security and VA benefits in making the equal division because caselaw prohibited
it from dividing these benefits between the parties. It explained that this result unfairly favored
Richard and it encouraged Gloria to appeal. The supreme court reversed, reasoning that though
courts may not offset Social Security benefits with a larger award of marital property, a court may
consider such benefits as one of several factors relevant to assessing the financial positions of each
party because such assessment is necessary to making fair allocation of the marital estate. Vacating
the superior court, and remanding for further consideration, the supreme court held that while a
court cannot lawfully divide social security benefits belonging to either spouse, courts have
discretion to consider them as evidence of the parties’ respective financial positions when
equitably dividing marital property.
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Edith A. v. Jonah A.
In Edith A. v. Jonah A.,101 the Supreme Court held that a party is entitled to a hearing on a motion
to modify legal custody if she has alleged specific facts which, if true, demonstrate a substantial
change in circumstances. Jonah and Edith were married in 2006 and had a son. Jonah filed for
divorce in 2008, and the two came to an agreement for joint legal custody. In April 2015 Edith
filed a motion to modify custody to obtain sole legal and primary physical custody. The superior
court denied the motion, though it found the parties were “remarkably unkind” and ordered them
to minimize contact for the benefit of the child. In July 2017, Edith filed a second motion once
again seeking to give herself sole custody. She credibly alleged that the current arrangement was
unworkable because Jonah failed to cooperate in getting the child to therapy, selecting a school,
and in ensuring adequate medical care. The superior court denied the second motion to modify
custody without a hearing, finding no credible argument that there has been a material change of
circumstances from the prior hearing. The supreme court disagreed. It found that Edith’s
allegations, if true represented a material change of circumstances. The court explained that joint
legal custody is not appropriate if parents are unable to cooperate in a child’s best interest.
Consequently, the court reasoned that a failure to cooperate can of justify a change in the custody
arrangement. The court concluded that Jonah’s alleged unwillingness to cooperate met this
standard and so a hearing was required. Reversing and remanding, the Supreme Court held that a
party is entitled to a hearing on a motion to modify legal custody if she has alleged specific facts
which, if true, demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances.
Farr v. Little
In Farr v. Little,102 the Supreme Court held that when a superior court uses its discretion to impute
income to a parent for child support purposes, it must set forth its factual findings and explanation
for the imputed income. Little was awarded custody of her and Farr’s children and filed a motion
for child support. Questions were raised about Farr’s ability to work stemming from an injury
sustained while serving in the Air Force. However, Farr claimed that he had received several offers
from Boeing for positions paying six-figure salaries. Little also stated in her affidavit and brought
up in her closing argument that Farr had been working for free as an HVAC mechanic. The trial
court found that Farr had the ability to earn $40,000 annually for child support purposes. Little did
not participate in the appeal, but Farr argues that a lack of evidence exists to support the $40,000
figure. The supreme court agreed, reasoning that a court’s determination of imputed income must
be supported by specific findings based on work history, qualifications, and job opportunities, and
the calculations supporting such finding must also be disclosed. It found no evidence existed of
Farr’s ability to work as an HVAC mechanic, or his ability to work for Boeing, and it determined
that the lower court failed to describe how it arrived at the $40,000 estimate. Reversing the lower
court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that when a superior court uses its discretion to impute
income to a parent for child support purposes, it must set forth its factual findings and explanation
for the imputed income.
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Fletcher v. Fletcher
In Fletcher v. Fletcher,103 the supreme court held that the trial court’s findings regarding the
division of marital property should have been sufficient to overcome the presumption of an equal
distribution of the property, and therefore the equal division was an abuse of the lower court’s
discretion. Married since 1990, Linda Fletcher filed for divorce from her husband David in 2014.
The marital house was purchased in Linda’s name, and the loan was taken out under her name, but
David had made substantial improvements. In 2010 David moved out of the house and began
living out of his truck. In 2015, he still resided there, though he indicated that he would soon have
the opportunity to begin living at a friend’s house for $600 per month. At the time David was 62,
ten years older than Linda, and in poor health. He had previously been diagnosed with type II
diabetes, and subsequently suffered two heart attacks (the first of which required surgery), and
later a stroke. David indicated that he would qualify for Medicare in 2017, but until then he would
have to pay for medical care, and he had had few assets: his social security disability, $1,200 in
savings, and two small pension accounts. In contrast, Linda was in better health, employed and
covered by her employer’s health insurance plan, had $6,000 in savings, and had two retirement
accounts valued at approximately $87,000 and $178,000. The superior court considered the
property division factors under AS 25.24.160(a)(4) and made relevant findings, determining that
the presumption of an equal division of the property was not overcome. The court awarded Linda
the marital home while ordering that she make an equalization payment of approximately $72,000
to David. Both parties appealed, the supreme court reversed. The court explained that in
determining an equitable division of marital property, the starting presumption is that the most just
outcome is achieved by an equal division. However, the court noted that the presumption may be
overcome if, after considering the Merrill v. Merrill104 factors codified in section 25.24.160(a)(4)
of the Alaska Statutes, a court finds an unequal division to be more equitable.105 The court
elaborated that these factors are not exhaustive and that trial courts need not make a finding as to
each factor. However, the court concluded that the findings must be sufficient to establish a factual
basis supporting the trial court’s conclusion. Analogizing to precedent where the supreme court
had vacated property divisions due to a court’s failure to consider parties’ health expenses in
conjunction with their reduced income, the court found that the equities weighed heavily in
David’s favor consider his age, health, and income disparity. The court concluded that a small
post-division payment did not justify the equal division of the marital estate. Reversing and
remanding on the issue, the court held that, based on the superior court’s findings, the property
division was clearly unjust and therefore an abuse of the superior court’s discretion in dividing the
marital estate.
Fox v. Grace
In Fox v. Grace,106 the supreme court held that an Alaskan court can modify an out-of-state custody
order if it determines that the child, the parent, and all persons acting as parents live outside the
issuing state. In early 2018, the Graces filed motions in an Oregon court to modify their custody
arrangement with Fox, the father of their grandchildren, and to hold Fox in contempt for missed
visitation. The court did not modify custody, but did add alternative visitation days to make up
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for those missed. Fox responded by filing a motion in an Alaskan superior court to modify the
Oregon court’s visitation order and terminate the Graces’ mandatory visitation rights. The superior
court held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction under section 25.30.320 of the Alaska
Statutes to modify the order unless Oregon released jurisdiction. Fox appealed. The supreme
court held that according to section 25.30.320 of the Alaska Statutes, an Alaska court can modify
an out-of-state custody order if that court has released its jurisdiction or if neither the child, a
parent, or a person acting as a parent resides in the state whose courts issued the order. The court
explained that a court must consider both sources of jurisdiction under the statute before it finds
that it lacks it. It noted that while the superior court correctly recognized that the Oregon court
had not given up jurisdiction, the superior court had failed to consider section 25.30.320(2). The
court continued, concluding that the Oregon court’s finding that the Graces had a child-parent
relationship with the children was not dispositive as that finding did not make them a person acting
as a parent under Alaska law. The supreme court vacated the superior court’s order and remanded
the case for further consideration, holding that if neither the child, a parent, or someone acting as
a parent resides in the state whose courts gave a custody order, then an Alaska court may modify
that state’s custody order.
Geldermann v. Geldermann
In Geldermann v. Geldermann,107 the supreme court held that a superior court may sua sponte
modify child support and custody agreements without a formal motion on the matter so long as
both parties have sufficient opportunity to be heard and actual notice that modification may be at
issue. After divorcing in 2011, Darcy and Matthew Geldermann agreed that their son would live
primarily with Darcey during the school year. In 2014, in response to a series of behavioral issues,
both parents agreed to have Matthew, who had since settled in California, temporarily take over
primary parenting during the school year, though they did not file this agreement with the court.
In late 2015, the arrangement fell apart, and both filed custody actions—Darcey in Alaska seeking
to enforce the 2011 agreement and Matthew in California seeking a transfer of jurisdiction and
codification of the informal 2014 agreement. The courts conferred and ultimately decided to keep
jurisdiction in Alaska. Although Matthew did not file a motion in Alaska to modify the 2011
agreement, the superior court denied Darcey’s motion and awarded Matthew primary physical
custody; Darcey appealed. The supreme court held that the superior court has authority to decide
both custody issues sua sponte and to retroactively modify child support arrangements after the
initial filing for modification of custody. The supreme court explained that as long as a party has
raised the issue of custody, and both sides are sufficiently informed going in that there is a possible
custody modification forthcoming, due process requirements are satisfied even if the court initiates
the modification of custody arrangements on its own. The supreme court also held that changes
in child support can be made effective without violating Alaska’s retroactive modification bar any
time after a petition to modify custody is filed as long as both parties have sufficient notice,
overruling its previous decision in Millette v. Millette that no change could be dated before an
actual motion to modify child support. The supreme court affirmed, holding that a superior court
may sua sponte modify child support and custody agreements without a formal motion on the
matter so long as both parties have sufficient opportunity to be heard and actual notice that
modification may be at issue.
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Holmes v. Holmes
In Holmes v. Holmes,108 the supreme court held that a two-week change in custody time by a
parent, and a change in a parent’s salary and employment status, constitute material changes which
justify a court’s decision to modify a child support order. Branlund Holmes and Tamara Holmes
shared custody of their two minor children. The superior court averaged the total amount of time
that the children spent with each parent for purposes of determining which had primary physical
custody. Branlund alleged that the superior court had also, in a prior year, allowed him to deduct
his travel expenses when calculating his income for child support purposes. The superior court
modified these orders awarding Tamara primary custody based on a two week change in the
children’s summer vacation schedule, and denying Branlund the ability to deduct travel expenses
based on a change in his income and employment status. On appeal, Branlund argued that neither
of these circumstances constituted a material change sufficient to allow modification to the child
support order. The supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the diminished time Branlund spent
with his children as a result of the change in summer vacation was material to his custody
determination. The supreme court further reasoned that Branlund’s salary decrease and change in
the fact that he no longer earned money from self-employment were material facts relating to the
issue of travel expenses and so allowed the court to modify how Branlund’s child support payments
were calculated. Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that a two-week
change in custody time by one parent, and a change in a parent’s salary and employment status,
constitute material changes which justify a court’s decision to modify a child support order.
In re the Adoption of E.H. and J.H.
In re the Adoption of E.H. and J.H.109 the supreme court held that an adoption decree is voidable
when based on material misrepresentation. Two young siblings, Simon and Ellie,110 were removed
from their parents’ home and placed with a foster family, but maintained a relationship with their
maternal grandparents. While Simon and Ellie lived with the foster family, the grandparents and
foster family often disagreed. After about two years, the state terminated the children’s parents’
parental rights. Both the foster family and grandparents sought to adopt the children. The
grandparents withdrew their request to adopt in exchange for an agreement with the foster family
that incorporated visitation rights. Soon after the adoption became official, the foster family
violated the terms of agreement by refusing to allow the grandparents to see Simon and Ellie. The
grandparents moved to reopen the adoption case; following an evidentiary hearing, the superior
court vacated the adoption. The foster family appealed. The foster family argued that enforcement
of the agreement, rather than vacating the adoption was the grandparents’ only available remedy.
The supreme court held that a fraudulent or material misrepresentation can be grounds for vacating
an adoption if the misrepresentation induces the consent of a party necessary to the adoption, or
causes assent to a settlement agreement incorporated in the adoption decree. Because the foster
family did not dispute the fact that they had no intention of abiding by the terms of the settlement,
the supreme court upheld the superior court’s decision to vacate the adoption. The court found
that the foster family’s misrepresentation and their conduct undermining the relationship terms in
the agreement invalidated the grandparents’ assent. Affirming the superior court’s decision, the
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supreme court held that a material misrepresentation used to obtain consent to an adoption, or to a
settlement agreement incorporated into an adoption decree, is grounds for vacating that adoption.
Jensen D. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Jensen D. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services,111 the supreme court held that it is not
an abuse of discretion to deny a request for self-representation at a parental custody termination
trial where the parent is either (1) incapable of presenting allegations in a rational and coherent
manner, (2) unable to understand what they are giving up by declining counsel, or (3) unwilling to
conduct herself with a modicum of courtroom decorum. Jensen D. was the mother of a sevenyear-old child who had been in the custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) since 2016
as a result of Jensen’s struggles with substance abuse and mental health. During proceedings
where OCS petitioned to terminate her parental rights, Jensen requested a different attorney, which
was denied in part because she seemed to be exhibiting the effects of methamphetamine. During
the termination trial, she appeared again to be under the influence of methamphetamine and was
denied a request to represent herself after she claimed her lawyer was not doing an effective enough
job. The superior court ultimately terminated her parental rights, and Jensen appealed the denial
of her request to represent herself. The supreme court held that although self-representation is an
established right, it is not absolute, and the superior court does not abuse its discretion in denying
a parent’s request for self-representation at a termination trial where the parent does not satisfy all
parts of the three-pronged test. Based on Jensen’s suspected drug abuse during the proceedings
and her inability to remain quiet during other witnesses’ testimony the Court determined that it
was not an abuse of discretion for the superior court to find Jensen had violated the third prong of
the test. The supreme court affirmed, holding that it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a request
for self-representation at a termination trial where the parent is either (1) incapable of presenting
allegations in a rational and coherent manner, (2) unable to understand what they are giving up by
declining counsel, or (3) unwilling to conduct herself with a modicum of courtroom decorum.
Kailyn S. v. Alaska Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Kailyn S. v Alaska Dep’t of Health & Social Services,112 the supreme court held that it is not an
abuse of discretion to deny a motion for a continuance in a termination of parental rights hearing
when the motion is only supported by a speculative assertion that it is necessary. Kailyn, a mother,
filed for a continuance five days before her termination of parental rights hearing in a Child in
Need of Aid (CINA) case. Kailyn argued that the continuance was necessary because she had been
offered a job on a fishing vessel that was scheduled to leave immediately, and because she needed
more time to speak with her attorney, so the attorney could provide effective assistance. The
superior court denied her motion, and at the subsequent hearing terminated Kailyn’s parental rights
for two of her children. Kailyn appealed arguing the superior court had abused its discretion. On
appeal, the supreme court emphasized the broad discretion exercised by the superior court when
granting or denying a continuance. It noted that Kailyn failed to explain how she would receive
more effective legal assistance should the continuance have been granted, that her motion was not
supported by evidence, and that she had not proposed a definite length for the continuance. The
supreme court explained that a court’s decision to deny a continuance is reviewed for abuse of
discretion, and that because CINA cases are time-sensitive it was reasonable for the superior court
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to prioritize the children’s interest in permanency over granting a request for a continuance
supported only by speculation. Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held denying a
motion for a continuance in a termination of parental rights hearing is not an abuse of discretion
when the motion is only supported by a speculative assertion that it is necessary for effective legal
assistance.
Kessler v. Kessler
In Kessler v. Kessler,113 the supreme court held the mere use of separate property for marital
purposes, without a donative intent, does not transform separate property into marital property. In
2010, Kenneth Kessler and Dianna Kessler were married; Dianna filed for divorce in 2015. Prior
to their marriage, in 1999, Kenneth bought a condominium. The couple began living in it in 2000
and continued living there for the majority of their marriage. During the divorce proceeding, the
superior court found that the condominium, which was originally Kenneth’s separate property, had
transmuted into marital property. That court reasoned that a change from separate property
(property acquired before the marriage) to marital property (property acquired during the marriage)
had occurred because the couple used the condominium as their marital home, Dianna contributed
to the management and maintenance of the property, and Kenneth would not have been able to
afford the condominium without Dianna’s financial contributions in other areas of their marriage.
The supreme court reversed the superior court’s decision, reasoning a donative intent must be
present for property brought into a marriage as separate property to change into marital property.
In the supreme court’s view, Kenneth never demonstrated that he desired to treat the condominium
as marital property, as Kenneth and Dianna did not both maintain and manage the property,
Kenneth was the sole title-holder of the property, and he did not present the property as a gift to
Dianna. Reversing the lower courts decision, the supreme court held the mere use of separate
property for marital purposes, without a donative intent, does not transform separate property into
marital property.
Laura B. v. Wade B.
In Laura B. v. Wade B.,114 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that substantially modifying a custody
agreement without holding a hearing to address the child’s best interests violates procedural due
process. Laura and Wade share legal custody and physical custody of their 17-year-old daughter.
In April of 2017, Wade moved for full custody. After an initial hearing, the superior court
determined that there had been a substantial change in circumstances from the initial agreement,
but it left the issue of the child’s best interests and the ultimate custody disposition unresolved,
instead directing further investigation. After the investigation, but without further hearing, the
superior court granted Wade’s motion. Laura appealed arguing that her due process rights were
violated by the failure to hold a second hearing. The supreme court overturned the custody
modification, explaining that a further hearing was required to comply with procedural due
process. The court stated that when making a material and substantial modification to a custody
agreement due process requires a hearing to make a findings on two issues. First, whether a
substantial change in circumstances has taken place since the initial agreement; and second, if so,
whether modification is in the best interests of the child. The court concluded that Laura was
denied due process because the initial hearing only determined that there was a substantial change
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in circumstances. It elaborated that at such a hearing she could have presented evidence that
despite the change in circumstances it was in their daughters’ best interest that Laura retain
custody, and Laura could have also rebutted the findings of the investigation. Thus, the supreme
court vacated and remanded the superior court’s decision, holding that in order to comport with
the Alaska Constitution’s procedural due process requirements, a hearing that substantially
modifies a custody agreement must address both whether a substantial change in circumstances
has taken place and whether an alteration is in the best interests of the child.
Maxwell v. Sosnowski
In Maxwell v. Sosnowski,115 the supreme court held that a court may only award credit for postseparation mortgage payments for those payments made after the date of separation. Jill Maxwell
and William Sosnowski permanently separated on May 31, 2013, and were later divorced. During
their marriage, they had purchased a triplex in Anchorage together. Sosnowski sought credit for
$134,041.02 in mortgage payments that he had made from October 2011 to April 2016. The
superior court granted Sosnowski this credit in a disbursement order. On appeal, Maxwell argued
that the disbursement order was inconsistent with the superior court’s finding that she and
Sosnowski had separated on May 31, 2013. The supreme court agreed, reasoning that the
separation date was not contested, and that Alaskan case law only allows for credits to be granted
for payments made from post-separation income. It explained that any payments made before the
legal separation were made with marital funds and so could not be credited. Vacating the
disbursement order, the supreme court held that a court may only award credit for post-separation
mortgage payments for those payments made after the date of separation.
Mengisteab v. Oates
In Mengisteab v. Oates,116 the supreme court held that, in deciding child custody when a parent
decides to physically relocate, a court must consider the effect the move may have on stability and
continuity in a child’s life. Mengisteab and Oates were the separated mother and father of a young
child. Mengisteab had primary custody of the child, and Oates had visitation rights. Both parents
resided in Alaska until Mengisteab abruptly relocated to Washington without informing the court
or Oates. The lower court found that Mengisteab’s motivation for moving was to make visitation
more difficult, and it ordered that the child be returned to Alaska or Mengisteab would lose primary
custody. On appeal, Mengisteab argued that the lower court failed to consider the potential
consequences to the child from separation should Mengisteab choose to remain in Washington.
The supreme court agreed, reasoning that in the parent relocation context a lower court must
explicitly discuss whether it would be in the best interest of the child to go with the moving parent
or stay with the remaining parent. Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held
that, in deciding child custody when a parent decides to physically relocate, a court must consider
the effect the move may have on stability and continuity in a child’s life.
Michael W. v. Brown
In Michael W. v. Brown,117 the supreme court held that that while section 13.26.132 of the Alaska
statutes allows for parental rights to be “suspended by circumstances,” that phrase focuses on
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parents’ ability to assume the responsibilities of parenthood, that custody will be harmful to a
child’s welfare for other reasons is not alone enough to terminate custodial rights. Following his
mother’s admittance to an alcohol rehabilitation center, the twelve-year-old son of separated
parents stayed with his grandparents in Alaska. Six months later, when the grandparents sought
appointment as the child’s guardians pursuant to section 13.26.132 of the Alaska Statutes, the
boy’s father, who lived in New York, opposed the grandparents’ petition. The father appealed the
superior court’s ruling that the son’s best interests weigh in favor of him staying with his
grandparents in Alaska. On appeal, the grandparents argued that it would be emotionally and
psychologically devasting for the son to leave his caretaker grandparents in Alaska to move to his
father in New York. Vacating the lower court’s order, the supreme court found that the father did
not lose his custodial rights solely because the son might be better off with different guardians.
Following the rationales of another state supreme court with an identical guardianship statute, the
court reasoned that parental rights of custody can be suspended by circumstances when their
conduct – broadly: abandonment, unfitness, or consent to guardianship by another – deprives them
of their rights and responsibilities as parents. Because the grandparents had not proved the father’s
unfitness or abandonment of the son in the lower court, they had not overcome the biologicalparent preference for custody rights. Vacating the lower court’s order, the supreme court held that
while section 13.26.132 of the Alaska statutes allows for parental rights to be “suspended by
circumstances,” that phrase focuses on parents’ ability to assume the responsibilities of
parenthood, that custody will be harmful to a child’s welfare for other reasons is not alone enough
to terminate custodial rights.
Miller v. Fowler
In Miller v. Fowler,118 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that summary judgment will rarely be
proper when the discovery rule is used to determine the accrual date of a statute of limitations as
determining that date is a fact intensive analysis. In September 2009, Miller purchased an
apartment building from Fowler with a promissory note. Miller was on notice that the building
had sewer line problems, but had been told that current problems were only caused by tenant
misuse as underlying issues had been fixed. Despite this, the sewer continued to back-up, and in
2012 Miller learned the line hade structural problems that needed correction. Fowler agreed to
three separate modifications of the note to help finance the repairs, the third of which allowed
Miller to defer on payments until June 2013 and to deduct $80,000 from the balance upon
completion of repairs. However, in February 2013, Fowler declared all modifications of the note
“null and void,” and in May began foreclosure proceedings. When Miller sued to stop the
foreclosure, enforce the agreed upon modifications, and for damages, Fowler moved for summary
judgment. The trial court granted Fowler’s motion, concluding that Miller’s claims were barred
by the two-year statute of limitations as Miller’s claims were based on misrepresentations from
four years beforehand. The supreme court reversed. The court explained that under the discovery
rule, the accrual date (the time at which the statute of limitation’s begins to run) for a claimant
occurs when that person has enough information to recognize a potential claim thereby prompting
them to begin an inquiry; the claimant does not need to possess enough information to establish
each of the elements of this potential claim. The court continued that while this date can be
resolved as a question of law, it is typically an intensive question of fact. And the court further
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noted that Fowler, as the movant, had the burden to show that no question of fact existed as to
when the statute of limitations began to run. From this the court reasoned that because Fowler
simply assumed the accrual date was the date of purchase, and offered no evidence on that point,
Fowler had failed to meet this burden. Reversing the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court
of Alaska held that summary judgment will rarely be proper when the discovery rule is used to
determine the accrual date of a statute of limitations as determining that date is a fact intensive
analysis.
Moore v. McGillis
In Moore v. McGillis, 119 the supreme court held the following: (1) a “substantial” change in a
custodial parent’s circumstances, which affects a child’s welfare, is necessary to warrant a
modification of child custody; (2) the intervention of a child’s biological parent constitutes a
change in circumstances that requires a trial court to reconsider the child’s best interest for custody
purposes; and (3) an individual’s child support obligation is not relinquished merely because a
child’s biological father or mother has intervened. In 2006, Moore and McGillis were married in
Ketchikan, Alaska. Prior to this marriage, Moore had a son from a previous relationship. The son’s
biological father had been absent since the son’s birth. In 2007, Moore and McGillis had another
child, a daughter. After several years of marriage, Moore and McGillis decided to get a divorce.
During the divorce proceedings, the court awarded Moore and McGillis shared legal custody of
both children. McGillis received primary custody of their daughter and Moore received primary
custody of her son (McGillis’s stepson). In 2013, Moore filed a motion to modify custody and
child support, asking for primary custody of their daughter and sole custody of her son. As a basis
for this modification request, Moore asserted that McGillis’s “chaotic” living environment and the
intervention of her son’s biological father constituted a changed circumstance warranting a
modification. The trial court denied Moore’s motion and terminated McGillis’s obligation to pay
child support for his stepson. In regards to the daughter, the supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, finding that the changes in McGillis’s circumstances were not “substantial” and
insufficient to warrant a modification of custody. In regard to McGillis’s stepson, the supreme
court reversed and remanded the lower courts decision, holding that the intervention of a
previously absent biological parent is a changed circumstance that requires the court to reassess
the child’s best interest and determine custody in light of the change. Furthermore, the supreme
court found McGillis had an obligation to pay child support for his stepson, as McGillis still had
legal custody of the child. Affirming in part, reversing in part and remanding, the supreme court
held: (1) a “substantial” change in a custodial parent’s circumstances is required to warrant a
modification of child custody; (2) the intervention of a child’s biological parent constitutes a
changed circumstance that requires a trial court to reconsider the child’s best interest for custody
purposes; and (3) an individual’s child support obligation is not relinquished merely because a
child’s biological parent has intervened.
Ruerup v. Ruerup
In Ruerup v. Ruerup,120 the supreme court held that while the superior court may modify or
dissolve a long-term protective order, it may not modify the factual findings on which the order is
based. In January 2015, Crystal Ruerup sought a protective order against her husband, Charles,
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alleging numerous incidents of domestic violence between 2007 and 2015. The magistrate judge
heard testimony from numerous friends and family members from both sides and ultimately issued
a long-term protective order after finding that, by a preponderance of the evidence, Charles had
committed three acts of domestic violence against Crystal. Charles filed for divorce in 2015, and,
when Crystal attempted to use Charles’ history of domestic violence to disfavor his ability to gain
custody of their oldest child, the superior court determined that it was not bound by the magistrate’s
findings on domestic violence. After hearing evidence from only the Ruerups, a friend of Crystal’s,
and Charles’s mother, the court rejected all of Crystal’s allegations while still affirming the
protective order (and uncontroversially amending it to allow Charles to take their son to school).
The supreme court held that parties should be able to easily modify a protective order to reflect
changed circumstances without carrying the risk that the underlying factual findings of domestic
violence will be relitigated. The supreme court reasoned that the statutory structure allows for
courts to issue subsequent orders modifying implementation provisions but leaving factual
considerations untouched. The supreme court vacated the superior court order, holding that while
the superior court may modify or dissolve a long-term protective order, it may not modify the
factual findings on which the order is based.
Solomon v. Solomon
In Solomon v. Solomon121, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a trial court must make sufficient
factual findings to allow review of its legal conclusion an individual has a history of domestic
violence. Terrace and Wendy Solomon married in 1999 and had four children; the two separated
in 2014, and in January 2015 Wendy filed for divorce. Terrace’s attorney had continuous difficulty
getting in touch with his client because Terrace had been arrested and was being held by the army.
As Terrace could not be contacted on the day of the trial Wendy was the only witness; she testified
to violent acts Terrace allegedly committed. The parties agreed Wendy should have sole physical
custody but disagreed on whether she should have sole legal custody. Though the superior court
did not specify the particular facts supporting its determination, it concluded that Terrace had a
history of domestic violence based on Wendy’s description of multiple incidents of low-level
domestic violence. This conclusion triggered a presumption that Terrace could not have any form
of custody of the children that could only be rebutted if he complied with the mandates of section
25.24.150(h) of the Alaska Statutes. On this basis the court awarded sole legal custody to Wendy.
Terrace appealed arguing the superior court had made insufficient findings to support its
conclusion. The Supreme Court of Alaska agreed and held a “superior court must make its findings
with sufficient specificity” to allow a higher court to “review both the grounds for its decision and
its application of the law to the facts.” The supreme court reasoned that for proper review of the
trial court’s decision the record needed enough specificity for the supreme court to determine
whether Wendy’s testimony established the elements of a domestic violence crime. The supreme
court concluded the record was insufficient as it only said Terrace “went far beyond the minimum
threshold of two” crimes. Vacating and remanding for further findings, the supreme court held that
a trial court must make sufficient findings to allow an appellate court to review its determination
that an individual has a history of domestic violence
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State Dep’t of Health & Social Services v. Michelle P.
In State Dep’t of Health & Social Services v. Michelle P.,122 the supreme court held that a court’s
authority to hear and decide a Child in Need of Aid (CINA) petition derives not from a grant of
custody or supervision to the Office of Children Services (OCS) but from the child’s status as a
child in need of aid. In October 2014, OCS took emergency custody of a six-month old Native
child, Natalie, and filed an emergency CINA petition. After an adjudication hearing in March
2015, her parents stipulated in a disposition order that she was child was in need of aid due to
neglect, that OCS would retain custody of her until her mother completed substance abuse
treatment (her father was incarcerated), and that OCS would retain supervision for one year. OCS
eventually returned Natalie to her parents, but one month later filed a motion for removal due to
her mother’s relapse and her father’s arrest. No party responded to OCS’s motion, which was
supported by an affidavit from a social worker. And on that basis the lower court authorized
removal by OCS. In March 2016, OCS petitioned to extend its custody of Natalie for another year.
Her father filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the disposition order had expired before OCS
petitioned for extended custody. The superior court eventually granted his motion and dismissed.
OCS appealed, and the father cross-appealed arguing that the superior court lacked jurisdiction
once the disposition order expired. The supreme court held that a court’s authority in CINA
proceedings derives from the child’s status as a child in need of aid rather than from the existence
of a disposition order. It reasoned that a different interpretation would add a jurisdictional limit
not present in the statutory text and would inconsistently require the courts ignore children’s best
interests. The supreme court found that the superior court erred when it granted removal based on
OCS’s unopposed motion and evidence to support such findings because the supporting affidavit
did not include information about the social worker’s expertise or findings that Natalie’s return
would result in serious emotional or physical damage. Thus, holding that a court’s authority to
hear a CINA petition derives from a child’s status as a child in need of aid rather than from a grant
of custody to OCS, the supreme court vacated the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and it also
vacated the removal order, remanding to determine whether OCS has grounds for custody and
whether removal is necessary.
Tomal v. Anderson
In Tomal v. Anderson,123 the supreme court held that in distributing property acquired during a
domestic partnership courts must (1) determine when the partnership began and ended; (2) classify
the property of that period as partnership or separate property (first according to statute or contract,
and then by the partners’ intent); (3) determine partnership property’s market value; and (4)
distribute the partnership property without reference to equity utilizing equalization payments if
necessary. In 1999, Tomal bought beachfront land where he and his domestic partner Anderson
restored a cabin to serve as their home with Anderson’s float house docked on the beach. Tomal
and Anderson each deposited their earnings into a joint account which Anderson used to pay joint
expenses until July 2011, when Tomal discovered Anderson’s money had been transferred into
her personal account and he retaliated in kind. In 2012, Anderson informed Tomal she would not
sleep in the same house as him in. For several years thereafter, she slept in the float house
whenever Tomal was on the property until winter difficulties forced her moved back into the cabin.
Despite this they rarely interacted, and they continued to take care of most necessities individually,
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though Tomal continued to pay for the property while Anderson managed its upkeep. In 2016,
Tomal sued Anderson for misappropriation of his funds and a share of the property expenses.
Anderson counterclaimed for a domestic partnership property division. The superior court found
Tomal had no valid misappropriation claims, that Anderson’s property maintenance was
equivalent to Tomal’s expenses, and that the parties had been in a domestic partnership until 2012
which required an equal division of property obtained prior to that point. The court concluded
Tomal’s pension, the property, and Anderson’s truck were partnership property and it accordingly
distributed them using equalization payments. Both Tomal and Anderson appealed. The supreme
court affirmed in part and remanded in part, concluding the superior court made minor errors.
Specifically, the supreme court confirmed that a court may find a domestic partnership has
terminated when partners take effective steps to cease cohabitation despite continuing to reside
within the same piece of property as cotenants. The court largely affirmed the superior court’s
findings as to the classification of property, but determined that Anderson’s truck could not be
partnership property, as Anderson acquired it after the partnership had terminated. Similarly, the
court largely affirmed the lower court’s valuation of the property, though it corrected the valuation
of an excavator where the lower court had improperly ignored the only evidence of fair market
value. Finally, the court affirmed that requiring Tomal to make an equalization payment to
Anderson for her share of Tomal’s pension was proper method of distributing the property as
Tomal was left discretion on how to make the payment. Ultimately, affirming in part and
remanding in part, the supreme court held that in distributing property acquired during a domestic
partnership courts must (1) determine when the partnership began and ended; (2) classify the
property of that period as partnership or separate property (first according to statute or contract,
and then by the partners’ intent); (3) determine partnership property’s market value; and (4)
distribute the partnership property without reference to equity utilizing equalization payments if
necessary.
Vince B. v. Sarah B.
In Vince B. v. Sarah B.,124 the supreme court held that the denial of an earlier petition for a
protective order does not necessarily bar a court from considering the same conduct in deciding a
later petition. In September 2016, Vince and Sarah divorced and began sharing custody of their
two sons. They had separated 2 and ½ years before, and in April of that year Sarah had filed for a
domestic violence protective order against Vince, testifying that he punched her boyfriend, made
offensive hand gestures at her and on several occasions made crude comments to both of them. In
response, Vince asserted that Sarah was exaggerating and expressed worry that Sarah’s boyfriend
was a dangerous influence on his children. The superior court believed Sarah’s version of events
but denied her petition concluding that Vince’s conduct did not yet rise to the level of harassment,
assault or stalking. However, the court put Vince on notice that another wrong move could make
Sarah eligible for a domestic violence order. In late December 2016, Sarah submitted another
petition for a protective order alleging that since April Vince had continued to harass her by text,
email, and phone and on one occasion that he had followed her to her boyfriend’s house causing
her to fear that violence would reoccur. Ultimately, the superior court found stalking in the second
degree and granted the domestic violence protective order. On appeal, Vince asserted that the trial
court violated the doctrine of res judicata by considering accusations raised in the first petition
when deciding on the second petition. The supreme court rejected his argument, affirming the
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superior court’s decision. The court explained that the superior court’s order was based on a
finding of stalking, and that the statutory definition of stalking entails a course of conduct. The
court elaborated that determining whether a course of conduct exists necessitates examining past
conduct. Reasoning from this the supreme court concluded that in deciding whether a course of
conduct exists res judicata does not prohibit reconsideration of prior conduct when this occurs in
conjunction with consideration of new conduct. Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme
court held that the denial of an earlier petition for a protective order does not necessarily bar a
court from considering the same conduct in deciding a later petition.
Wiegers v. Richards-Wiegers
In Wiegers v. Richards-Wiegers,125 the supreme court reviewed the lower court’s division of a
marital estate and held that a court can rely on an expert witness’s valuation method when
recognized as valid and adequately supported by the expert’s testimony. Additionally, the court
held that retirement health benefits vested before marriage can be marital assets if they continue
to be funded during the marriage. Amy and Charles married in 1987, separated in 2014, and
finalized their divorce in 2016. During their marriage, Charles obtained shares in his company that
the company valued at $179 per share. Amy, who’s retirement benefits with the Alaska Public
Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) had vested in 1985, continued to work, accruing 11.7
years of her 18.7 years of PERS service during the marriage. The superior court rejected the $179
valuation of Charles’ shares, adopting Amy’s expert’s method of valuation which put them at
$217, and it found that Amy’s retirement benefits were premarital assets as they had vested before
the marriage. Charles appealed, arguing that the court relied on unsupported expert testimony to
reach the valuation and that it incorrectly applied Sparks v. Sparks to determine whether Amy’s
retirement benefits were marital assets. As to the valuation method, the supreme court ruled it was
not clear error for the superior court to make findings using Amy’s expert’s valuation method
because the expert’s testimony provided an adequate basis for the court’s valuation finding, and
because the expert used a recognized valuation method. As to Amy’s PERS retirement health
benefits, the supreme court explained that some portion of Amy’s retirement benefits were marital
property. It explained that the superior court should have applied Engstrom v. Engstrom which
held that when retirement benefits have vested before a marriage, the portion constituting marital
property is equal to the fraction of the years a spouse contributed to funding the benefits during
the marriage divided by the total years worked.126 Holding that retirement benefits vested prior to
marriage but funded after it may be marital property, and that a court may rely on a recognized
valuation method sufficiently supported by expert testimony, the supreme court reversed the
characterization of Amy’s PERS benefits as non-marital, affirmed the valuation of Charles’s
shares, and remanded for valuation of Amy’s PERS benefits.
Wyman v. Whitson
In Wyman v. Whitson,127 the supreme court held that because fishing permits and quota shares are
perpetual intangible assets with an indefinite useful life, an amortization of those assets is not
deductible from income for child support purposes. Wyman, a self-employed commercial
fisherman, owned several fishing permits and individual fishing quota shares as part of his
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business. Each year, Wyman made a deduction on his federal income tax return for amortization
of those intangible assets. Wyman argued that those deductions should also apply to his income
for purposes of calculating child support, as they reflected ordinary and necessary expenses
required to produce income and were no different than depreciation deductions allowed under
Eagley v. Eagley. The supreme court disagreed, explaining that deductions are not automatically
permitted for child support purposes merely because they are allowed by the IRS. The court
explained that in Eagley and other cases, the court had permitted depreciation deductions from
income for child support purposes so long as the deduction in question was demonstrated to reflect
an ordinary and necessary business expense. It explained that in Eagley the supreme court focused
on the depreciation of buildings, fixtures, and other improvements in a restaurant, which were
considered equivalent to other business equipment. The supreme court elaborated that depreciation
expenses are deductible because the depreciation itself represents a real, tangible, and necessary
cost. While Wyman’s fishing permits and quota shares were capital assets necessary to produce
income, they were perpetual intangible assets. They did not expire or wear out and required no
capital to preserve. Thus, the supreme court affirmed and held that because fishing permits and
quota shares are perpetual intangible assets with an indefinite useful life, amortization of those
assets is not deductible from income for child support purposes.
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HEALTH LAW
Alaska Ass’n. of Naturopathic Physicians v. State Dep’t of Commerce
In Alaska Ass’n. of Naturopathic Physicians v. State Dep’t of Commerce,128 the supreme court held
that new regulations prohibiting naturopathic physicians from using or prescribing all prescription
medicines are consistent with the enabling statute. Alaska established a statutory licensing
structure for naturopathy129 in 1986, and conferred regulatory authority to the Department of
Commerce in 1992.130 In 2012, the Department amended its regulatory definitions, so that the
definition of prescription drugs was expanded to include all prescription medicine and it explicitly
excluded prescription drugs from the regulatory definitions of dietetics, herbal medicines, and
homeopathic remedies. The effect was to prevent naturopaths from using or prescribing any
prescription medicines, including injectable vitamins and minerals and herbal or homeopathic
remedies. In 2014, the Alaska Association of Naturopathic Physicians sought declaratory judgment
that the amended regulations were invalid to the extent that they conflicted with the enabling
statute. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. On appeal, the
Association argued that the new regulatory definitions were inconsistent with the definitions of
and restrictions on naturopathy in the enabling statute; in particular it argued the statute merely
prohibits naturopaths from using prescription drugs as opposed to all prescription medicine. The
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the statutory text and structure
do not point to a broad conferral of prescribing power upon naturopathic physicians, especially
when compared to other regulated health professions. The court also found that the statute’s
drafting process winnowed away at naturopaths’ prescribing power, further suggesting that the
statute did not convey any prescribing authority to naturopaths. Affirming the lower court’s
summary judgment in favor of the Department, the supreme court held that new regulations
prohibiting naturopathic physicians from using or prescribing all prescription medicines are
consistent with the enabling statute.
Harrold-Jones v. Drury
In Harrold-Jones v. Drury,131 the supreme court held that a defendant may only make ex parte
contact with a plaintiff’s treating physicians with the plaintiff’s consent or a court order, the latter
of which is to be issued only in extraordinary circumstances. In 2014, Harrold-Jones received
treatment for a fractured clavicle from Dr. Drury and Dr. Pace at Denali Orthopedic Surgery. After
transferring to a new facility and a third doctor, Harrold-Jones sent a draft malpractice complaint
against Drury and Pace to Denali; despite several requests by Denali’s counsel that she authorize
the release of her medical records, Harrold-Jones repeatedly refused. When Harrold-Jones sought
a protective order to prevent Denali’s counsel from having ex parte contact with her new physician
the superior court denied her request and authorized such contact on the basis of Langdon v.
Champion. The supreme court held that although the federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) does not preempt Alaska’s law allowing ex parte contact, it
was time to overrule Langdon as HIPAA represented changes in the culture of medical privacy
that made Langdon obsolete. The court explained that Langdon allowed ex parte contact because
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at the time filing a medical malpractice suit waived physician-patient privilege. This meant that
ex parte contact facilitated cost-effective discovery without infringing on expectations of privacy.
Contrasting Langdon with HIPAA, the court noted that HIPAA represented a shift in cultural and
legal barriers to discovery in a medical malpractice suits. The court explained that HIPAA’s
restrictions make lawful ex parte contact effectively identical to court-ordered discovery and
supervision, and that this is a cumbersome process at odds with HIPAA’s court order-based
discovery rules. On this basis, the supreme court reasoned that it would be more in line with current
views on medical privacy to limit medical discovery methods to formal procedures. Reversing
and remanding for further proceedings, the supreme court held that a defendant may only contact
a plaintiff’s treating physicians after getting either the plaintiff’s permission or a court order, the
latter of which is to be issued only in extraordinary conditions.
In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M.
In the In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M.,132 the supreme court held that, under
section 47.40.655 of the Alaska Statutes, to involuntarily commit someone who is gravely disabled
by mental illness but not a danger to others, the state must show that commitment provides a
reasonable possibility of improvement by clear and convincing evidence. Darren M. was
involuntarily committed to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) after a mental health evaluation
prompted by his family’s concerns about his mental health and safety. Darren suffers from
Korsakoff syndrome133 and bipolar disorder.134 API sought to extend Darren’s commitment for
ninety days on the grounds that he was gravely disabled because of his mental illness. The superior
court granted API’s request and Darren appealed. Among other issues, Darren claimed that the
superior court failed to find sufficient evidence that his commitment “would: improve with
treatment as it only required the state to prove that he “could” improve. Darren contended that
this lesser standard violated the governing statute. The supreme court disagreed. It noted that the
statute’s language only required the state allege a “reasonable expectation” of improvement with
an implicit requirement that the state actually prove its allegations. The court reasoned that
statutory language did not compel either standard. Ultimately, the court determined that requiring
the state to prove a person “will” improve from commitment is too high burden, so the court held
that the “reasonable expectation” requirement only means the state must prove a “reasonable
possibility” of improvement before commitment. Additionally, noting the importance of the
liberty interest in question and the severity of involuntary commitment, the court required the state
to meet this burden through clear and convincing evidence. Applying this standard to the case at
hand, the court found that the state’s expert’s testimony met the burden. Affirming the superior
court’s commitment order, the supreme court held that, under section 47.40.655 of the Alaska
Statutes, to involuntarily commit someone who is gravely disabled by mental illness but not a
danger to others, the state must show that commitment provides a reasonable possibility of
improvement by clear and convincing evidence.
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In re the Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M.
In In re the Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M.,135 the supreme court held that a court
must conduct a post-petition screening investigation, or appoint a mental health professional to
conduct one, before granting a petition for involuntary hospitalization under section 47.30.700 of
the Alaska Statutes. A psychologist at a mental health clinic petitioned to have a patient
involuntarily hospitalized. The superior court held a hearing on the petition at which only the
psychologist gave substantive testimony. The court granted the petition, and the patient was
hospitalized. The patient appealed, arguing that the trial court violated section 47.30.700 of the
Alaska Statutes by not ensuring that a full screening investigation was conducted before it issued
the order for her involuntary hospitalization. The supreme court agreed, explaining that three key
events must occur before an individual may be involuntary hospitalized: first, an adult must
petition a superior court for the respondent’s involuntary hospitalization; second, a judge or mental
health professional must conduct a screening investigation to evaluate the allegations in the
petition; third, the court must find probable cause that the respondent is mentally ill and that this
mental illness causes the respondent to be gravely disabled or to present a likelihood of serious
harm to self or others. Finally, the court explained that the required screening investigation should
take place after a petition has been filed, and the screening investigation should, if possible, include
an interview with the respondent. Thus, the supreme court concluded that the superior court
violated section 47.30.700 of the Alaska Statutes by not conducting a post-petition interview with
the respondent or attempting to determine whether one would be reasonably possible. Reversing,
the supreme held that a court must conduct a post-petition screening investigation, or appoint a
mental health professional to conduct one, before granting a petition for involuntary
hospitalization.
Kiva O. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services
In Kiva O. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services,136 the supreme court held that the standard
of Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute137 governs whether the Office of Children’s Services
(OCS) may medicate a child against a parent’s wishes.138 The mother of a ten-year-old child in
OCS custody refused to allow her son to be medicated by a psychiatrist to treat his behavioral
problems and depressive symptoms. OCS sought, and the superior court issued, an order granting
OCS the authority to consent to the psychiatrist’s recommended administration of a particular
antidepressant and additional mood stabilizer, and the mother appealed. On appeal, the mother
argued that the superior court’s findings of fact did not satisfy the Myers standard, which the
superior court had refused to apply. The Myers test balances the importance of a fundamental
constitutional right with the state’s interest in limiting that right, requiring the state to show a
compelling state interest and the absence of less restrictive means to advance the state’s
objective.139 The supreme court agreed with the mother that the Myers standard protected her
constitutional right as a parent to determine her child’s medical treatments.140 Nevertheless,
applying Myers, the supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision to allow OCS to consent to
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the administration of the antidepressant drug to the son. While the court found that medicating the
son without his mother’s consent substantially burdened the mother’s constitutional rights, the
court concluded that OCS had a compelling interest and that the antidepressant was the least
intrusive available treatment. However, the supreme court reversed the superior court’s
authorization of the mood stabilizer, reasoning that, without observing the reaction and progress
of the child to the antidepressant, it was too early to conclude that the mood stabilizer was the
least-intrusive treatment available. Lastly, the court was unpersuaded by the mother’s contention
that finding she lacked capacity to consent, or that her refusal to consent was unreasonable, was
necessary to overcome her parental rights. The court concluded that the Myers standard alone
adequately those rights. Accordingly, in affirming the authorization of the antidepressant but
reversing the authorization of the mood stabilizer, the supreme court held that the Myers standard
applies to a court’s decision to authorize medication for a child in the custody of OCS over a
parent’s objection.
Mat-Su Valley Medical Center, LLC v. Bolinger
In Mat-Su Valley Medical Center, LLC v. Bolinger,141 the Supreme Court held that the medical
peer review privilege of section 18.23.030 of the Alaska Statutes protects complaint-related
materials contained in peer review committee files, even if the materials originated outside the
peer review process.142 A hospital invoked the peer review privilege in two separate actions, one
involving a wrongful death suit against a physician at the hospital, and the other involving both a
medical malpractice claim against the same physician and a negligent credentialing claim against
the hospital.143 In each case the superior court compelled the hospital to disclose materials related
to complaints about the physician’s conduct and the hospital’s decision to grant the physician
medical staff membership.144 The superior court reasoned that materials regarding such
complaints fell outside the peer review privilege because although they may later become evidence
in a peer review proceeding, they are based on observations occurring in the normal course of
rendering medical care and preceding the commencement of peer review.145 The supreme court
disagreed, finding that complaint-related materials contained in peer review committee files, the
identities of the individuals reporting and reviewing the complaints, and any internal action taken
in response satisfy the requirements for the privilege to apply.146 For the privilege to apply, the
materials must be acquired by a peer review committee in the exercise of its duties and functions,
which includes evaluating and improving the quality of health care rendered in the hospital.147
Here, Mat-Su employees are instructed to report concerns about physicians that implicate patient
care to the committees.148 Therefore, these complaints were acquired by a peer review committee
in the exercise of its duties and functions.149 Thus, the supreme court reversed the superior court’s
order compelling disclosure and held that the medical peer review privilege in section 18.23.030
141
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of the Alaska Statutes protects complaint-related materials contained in peer review committee
files, even if the materials originated outside the peer review process.150
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INSURANCE LAW
Hahn v. Geico Choice Ins. Co.
In Hahn v. Geico Choice Ins. Co.,151 the supreme court held that the “reasonable” interpretation of
an insurance policy involves an examination of “(1) the language of the disputed provisions in the
policy, (2) other provisions in the policy, (3) extrinsic evidence, and (4) case law interpreting
similar provisions.” Hahn was stopped at a red light when Townsend struck the Hahn’s
motorcycle, causing Hahn to momentarily landed on the hood, windshield, and roof of Townsend’s
vehicle. Hahn believed that he was entitled to underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage because he
“occupied,” as defined by GEICO’s policy, Townsend’s vehicle at the time of the collision.
GEICO disagreed and filed suit against Hahn seeking a declaratory judgment that there was no
UIM coverage available to Hahn because he was not in fact “occupying,” Townsend’s vehicle at
the time of the collision. The superior court granted GEICO summary judgment. Hahn appealed.
The supreme court stated that under Alaska law, insurance contracts are interpreted according to
the “reasonable expectations” of the insured. Affirming the superior court’s summary judgment,
the supreme court held that Hahn’s construction of “occupying” was not “reasonable” because of
“(1) the language of the disputed provisions in the policy, (2) other provisions in the policy, (3)
extrinsic evidence, and (4) case law interpreting similar provisions.”
Levi v. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Development
In Levi v. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Development,152 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that it
is fraudulent for an individual to knowingly fail to report earnings over 50 dollars per week when
collecting unemployment insurance benefits under section 23.20.360 of the Alaska Statutes. Levi
received unemployment insurance benefits intermittently between 2010 and 2014. While
receiving those benefits, he was also working part time in various teaching positions. To receive
the benefits Levi filed a biweekly certification form, prepared according to a Department handbook
he possessed which contained specific instructions. Despite being employed, Levi improperly
stated he was not and so avoided reporting wages he had received for more than 50 weeks. Wages
must be reported because the benefits received are reduced by 75 cents for every dollar earned
over 50 dollars each week. The Department sent Levi a notice of determination on December 21,
2016 concluding that Levi had failed to report and had “grossly underreported” his work and
earnings for the 50 weeks spanning from 2010 to 2014. It required Levi pay back the benefits, a
total of $25,122, and barred him from receiving further benefits for 52 weeks. Levi appealed the
Department’s determination arguing, among other things, that he had reasonably interpreted the
handbook to only require he report earnings greater than 50 dollars per day (instead of per week)
due to its allegedly ambiguous wording. The Supreme Court of Alaska rejected this argument. It
explained that regardless of whether the handbook was ambiguous, Levi had a duty to read the
statute which was plain that the reporting requirement was based on weekly, not daily, earnings
above 50 dollars. The court further found that even if failure to read the statute was excusable, the
handbook was not ambiguous. Finally, the court concluded that even if the statute and the
handbook had been ambiguous, Levi had acted fraudulently because under his interpretation of the
reporting requirements he still failed to report wages for nine continuous weeks where he earned
wages greater than $50 per day. Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that it is
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fraudulent for an individual to knowingly fail to report earnings over 50 dollars per week when
collecting unemployment insurance benefits under section 23.20.360 of the Alaska Statutes.
Ray Klein, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Alaska Electrical Health & Welfare Fund
In Ray Klein, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Alaska Electrical Health & Welfare Fund,153 the
district court held that state law insurance claims are preempted by ERISA when they are rooted
in an ERISA plan’s definition of the scope of covered charges. The Alaska Electrical Health and
Welfare Fund (“Fund”) was created under the Labor Management Relations Act and ERISA and
provides healthcare benefits to Alaska’s electrical workers and their dependents. The Fund entered
into an agreement with several healthcare providers, including Providence Health and Services
(“Providence”). After the premature birth of a pair of twins covered by the Fund, Providence billed
the Fund for just over $4 million on the basis of the agreement; the Fund refused to pay $1.1
million of the bill. Providence, through Ray Klein, Inc. (“PCS”), brought a common law claim for
breach of contract, but the Fund argued that the claim was preempted by ERISA. The district court
explained that ERISA preempts state law claims related to an employee benefit plan (“Plan”)
provided under that title. The district court explained that a “relationship test” should be applied
to determine if a claim relates to a Plan. This test focuses on whether the claims references and
depends on an ERISA-regulated relationship. Under this test, the district court explained that the
Fund’s ERISA plan dictates the services the Fund covers for beneficiaries, so claims about the
scope of that coverage necessarily relate to the existence of an ERISA regulated-relationship.
Granting the Fund’s motion for summary judgment, the district court held that claims regarding
coverage are preempted where they are rooted in an ERISA plan’s definition of the scope of
covered charges.
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LEGAL ETHICS
In re Albertsen
In In re Albertsen,154 the supreme court held that, as a result of an attorney’s six ethical violations
including failure to act with due diligence, failure to maintain adequate communication with a
client, and failure to adequately communicate with the disciplinary committee, a two-year-andone-day suspension was appropriate. Albertsen, an attorney in Alaska, represented a client seeking
to foreclose on real estate properties. Albertsen represented this client from 2008 until 2016, during
which time he failed to inform the client of significant changes to his client’s matters, including
fee increases and settlements. Albertsen’s client obtained new counsel and in 2016 submitted a
complaint to the Alaska Bar Association. Albertsen failed to adequately respond. As a result of
these and other complaints, the disciplinary board, working with Albertsen’s cooperation and
consent, recommended he be suspended for two years and one day suspension, that he be ordered
to pay costs, and that he be received continuing legal education and a psychological evaluation
prior to reinstatement. The supreme affirmed the disciplinary board’s finding of facts and analysis
and ordered its recommended penalties be put into effect. Affirming the disciplinary board’s
recommendation, the supreme court held that, as a result of an attorney’s six ethical violations
including failure to act with due diligence, maintain adequate communication with a client, and
adequately communicate with the disciplinary committee, a two-year-and-one-day suspension was
appropriate.
In re Reger
In In re Reger155, the supreme court adopted the recommendations of the bar association’s
disciplinary board, holding that violations of the ethics rules are properly attributed to an attorney
when the violations occurr due to improper delegation of authority to a non-attorney assistant, and
inadequate supervision of that assistant. Lawrence Reger hired KW, a non-attorney, as a legal
assistant. Over time, KW became a key part of Reger’s practice, taking on responsibility for client
communication. Reger also entrusted KW with filing documents at the court in a timely manner.
When cash flow issues threatened the practice, Reger took a loan from KW, agreeing to share
future profits with her 50-50. Eventually, Reger realized that communication with his clients was
breaking down. He failed to appear in court on at least one occasion, and missed critical filing
deadlines. These problems led two clients to file bar grievances against Reger. After reviewing
those complaints, the disciplinary board found six violations of the rules: 1) Reger violated Rule
1.3 by missing deadlines and failing to appear. 2) Reger violated Rule 1.4 by turning over
communication to KW, failing to notify clients of pending proceedings, and failing to tell one
client his case had been dismissed. 3) Reger violated Rule 5.3 by failing to supervise KW to ensure
her conduct conformed with the rules. 4) Reger violated Rule 5.4 by sharing profits with KW, a
non-lawyer. 5) Reger violated Rule 1.15 by failing to account to a client upon request and failing
to deliver funds to the client’s new lawyer. 6) Reger violated Rule 1.16 when he failed to surrender
client files and return unearned fees upon termination of representation. The disciplinary board
recommended he be suspended for six months, ordered to complete nine hours of CLE, and
required to pay $1,000 in costs to the board. The supreme court adopted the board’s analysis and
ordered the recommended discipline be imposed, holding that violations of the ethics rules are
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properly attributed to an attorney when the violations occur due to improper delegation of authority
to a non-attorney assistant, and inadequate supervision of that assistant.
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PROPERTY LAW
Beecher v. City of Cordova
In Beecher v. City of Cordova,156 the supreme court held that, upon the grant of a motion for an
accounting, the burden falls on the nonmoving party to provide a proper accounting, even if there
is a significant burden to do so. In 1997, the Beechers entered into a lease with the City of Cordova
to operate a fueling facility on City-owned land. The Beechers fell behind on rent, eventually
leading to their eviction in 2003. Upon vacating the premises, the Beechers left behind personal
property, including vehicles, fuel tanks, and trailers. The City filed a creditor’s affidavit stating
that it would attempt to satisfy the judgment by selling some of the abandoned property. After two
years, the City ceased collection efforts. Eight years passed, and when the City obtained a renewal
judgment, the Beechers filed a motion in superior court seeking an accounting of the City’s
collection efforts, specifically, what had become of their personal property. The City responded
that it had sold certain improvements from the fueling facility, and additionally that some of the
property identified in the creditor’s affidavit had been foreclosed upon and sold at auctions. The
Beechers responded by providing a full list of personal property, most of which was not included
in the City’s initial accounting, that they valued at nearly three-quarters of the entire judgment.
The superior court ruled that the original accounting was proper, and the supreme court heard the
appeal. The supreme court agreed with the Beechers that the city’s accounting was inadequate. It
explained that the moving party must show that a relationship exists between itself and the
nonmoving party, that the relationship requires an accounting, that a balance is due, and that the
balance can only be ascertained by an accounting. Upon showing such facts, the burden falls on
the nonmoving party to make a proper accounting. The City argued that the burden was too great,
considering the passage of time, to make an accounting of all the listed property. The supreme
court rejected this argument, reasoning that the Beechers had demonstrated facts necessary to
establish the City’s duty to account, and that a significant burden to conduct a proper accounting
does not eliminate this duty. The court reversed the superior court’s order denying the Beechers’
motion for an accounting, holding that the burden is on the City to render a proper accounting,
even though a proper accounting involves a significant burden.
Dickson v. State Dep’t of Natural Resources
In Dickson v. State Dep’t of Natural Resources,157 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that RS 2477
rights of travel allow for public access to federal land intended for non-public use. In 1958,
Benjamin Cowart homesteaded 160 acres, across the southern part of which his neighbor built
Homestead Road without permission. The public began using this road year-round for various
purposes, also without permission. Then, in 1983, the State notified Cowart that the Historic
Iditarod Trail also crossed his property. Cowart soon learned the Iditarod trail race was scheduled
to cross his property along that path the following year; he objected to this and posted a private
property no-trespassing sign at the point the trail entered his land. In 2008, after inheriting the
property from her father, Kelly Dickson also blocked off Homestead Road. When the public
ignored the signs and barriers and continued to use both paths, Dickson filed a complaint to quiet
title to the trail and the road that crossed her property. The lower court found the Historic Iditarod
Trail followed an RS 2477 right of way because the trail had been established before Cowart
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acquired title to the land, and that Homestead Road was a public prescriptive easement. The
Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that section 8 of the Lode Mining Act of 1866 (repealed in
1976) allowed for the creation of RS 2477 right of ways on federal lands either through public
acceptance, established through sufficient public use, or through manifestation of official intent,
before the lands became privatized. It further explained that RS 2477 right of ways were explicitly
limited to federal land “not reserved for public uses,” including lands intended for settlement by
private parties. The court reasoned that the lower court had sufficient evidence to find that this
had occurred for the sections of the Iditarod trail crossing the land before Cowart had converted it
into private property. The court further found that the lower court had sufficient evidence to find
that Homestead Road had been used by the public continuously, year-round, for at least 10 years,
thereby establishing a public prescriptive easement. Because the supreme court found no clear
error in the lower court’s factual findings, it affirmed, holding that RS 2477 rights of travel allow
for public access to federal land intended for non-public use, and remanded only for further
consideration of attorneys’ fees.
Keenan v. Meyer
In Keenan v. Meyer,158 the supreme court upheld the superior court’s award of compensatory
damages and full attorneys’ fees in a dispute between neighbors over an access easement and water
rights, holding that the superior court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and the district
court did not abuse its discretion. The Keegans and Meyers each owned part of a subdivided lot
(Lot 3) in the Macdonald Spit community. When the lots were subdivided, the original owners
reached an agreement that created a ten foot access easement, which ran with the land, adjacent to
the properties and granted the owners of both properties water rights to a well on the Keegans’
property. The Meyers purchased the lot next to the Keegans and began renovating their cabin,
eventually making improvements to the access easement and the well. After bad feelings arose
between the neighbors, the Keegans eventually blocked vehicle traffic from using the access
easement and cut off the Meyers’ water. In the ensuing litigation, the superior court ruled in favor
of the Meyers, awarding them compensatory damages for the loss of use of the easement, their
property for the time it was without water, and the full attorneys’ fees incurred by the Meyers. The
Keegans appealed claiming error in the calculation of damages and the award of all attorneys’ fees.
The supreme court held that the calculation of damages was acceptable and that the award of
damages for loss of use of both the easement and the property did not affect a double recovery,
since the injuries were distinct. Based on consideration of the Rule 82(b)(3) factors, the court
found that awarding full attorneys’ fees was appropriate because the Keegans acted in bad faith by
bringing improper pressure to bear on the Meyers during the litigation by cutting off their easement
and water rights. The superior court’s decision and award in favor of the Meyers was affirmed.
Reeves v. Godspeed Properties, LLC
In Reeves v. Godspeed Properties, LLC,159 the supreme court held that Alaska law recognizes
partial extinguishment of easements through prescription. After a series of property transfers,
Reeves owned an easement on a piece of Godspeed’s property. Reeves offered to sell the easement
to Godspeed, but the parties were unable to come to an agreement. Godspeed sued Reeves for quiet
title, claiming that Reeves’ easement was invalid. The superior court held that Reeves’ easement
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was valid, but used the standard previously established in Hansen v. Davis160 to determine that the
adverse presence of a gold plant terminated the easement by prescription.161 Reeves and Godspeed
both appealed, with Godspeed arguing that the easement was not created because of ambiguities
in the deed, and Reeves arguing that the easement was not extinguished by prescription, or
alternatively that the easement should only be partially extinguished. The supreme court agreed
that an easement existed, and agreed that the easement was extinguished on the location of the
gold plant, but rejected the superior court’s holding that the remainder of the easement was
extinguished, reasoning that allowing for partial extinguishment by prescription leads to legal
outcomes that better reflect reality. Affirming in part and reversing in part the superior court’s
decision, the supreme court held Alaska law recognizes partial extinguishment of easements
through prescription.
Riddle v. Lanser
In Riddle v. Lanser,162 the supreme court held that the Right to Farm Act does not shield individuals
from nuisance liability where the activity is not part of an “agricultural facility” or “agricultural
operation at an agricultural facility” before becoming a nuisance. In 2005, Riddle acquired
property covered by a farm conservation plan, and he used it to maintain some livestock, to produce
some crops, and to store sewage in septage lagoons as part of his business pumping septic tanks.
In 2007 Riddle obtained permits to spread septage on his fields, but he did not disclose he
possessed septage lagoons so the permit was confined to sewage obtained elsewhere. In that same
year, a real estate developer acquired adjacent property where it built and sold residences. In 2010,
after Riddle began to accept sewage from septic companies beyond his own, residents of the
adjacent property began complaining of the smell. In 2011 Riddle obtained an amended farm plan
allowing him to maintain septage lagoons so long as the primary use of the property was
agricultural and the septage lagoons were used for this agricultural use, and in December Lanser
sued for nuisance. The superior court held in favor of the real estate developer, following a twostep analysis that first found the septage lagoons to be a nuisance, and second found that the
lagoons were not “an agricultural facility or an agricultural operation” protected under the Right
to Farm Act. The supreme court affirmed the nuisance holding, finding that the superior court did
not clearly err in its findings first that the septage lagoons constituted a private nuisance. Second,
it explained that the Right to Farm Act did not protect Riddle from nuisance liability because the
nuisance arose prior to the septage lagoons’ actual or intended use for commercial agricultural
purposes. Further, it explained that the limited agricultural activity on the property did not
transform the initial non-agricultural use of the septage lagoons into a protected agricultural action.
Affirming-in-part and reversing-in-part (as to fees) the supreme court held that the Right to Farm
Act does not shield individuals from nuisance liability where the activity is not part of an
“agricultural facility” or “agricultural operation at an agricultural facility” before becoming a
nuisance.
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TORT LAW
In re Angelette, LLC
In In re Angelette, LLC,163 the United States District Court for the District of Alaska determined
that maintenance and cure claims are not subject to the Limitation of Liability Act, making the
shipowner’s duty to pay maintenance and cure virtually automatic. Jay Thomassen is the sole
member of Angelette, LLC; a corporation that owned a ship, the Kupreanof, which sank during a
fishing expedition. The Kupreanof’s captain said that three days after the voyage began all of the
ship’s pumps were working, including the lazarette pump. However, at some point fishing gear
had been stowed on top of the lazarette pump preventing the crew from checking whether water
was entering it. When the vessel began to sink the captain was forced to make a Mayday call to
the United States Coast Guard and abandon the vessel. The captain and crew were rescued before
the Kupreanof sank completely, and after Angelette, LLC sued for a declaration of no liability they
counter-claimed for maintenance and cure. Angelette, LLC then moved for summary judgment
on those claims arguing that the Limitation of Liability Act does not require payment of
maintenance and cure. The district court explained that maintenance and cure damages provide
seamen with lodging and food when they become ill or injured while serving upon a ship; and it
elaborated that these damages continues until the seaman recovers as much as he is able. Adopting
reasoning of the 5th Circuit, the district court concluded that maintenance and cure is a distinct
remedy from negligence or unseaworthiness and that the Limitation of Liability Act only applies
to the latter remedies. As a result, recovery for maintenance and cure is virtually automatic.
Rejecting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the court held that maintenance and cure
claims are not subject to limitation on the Limitation of Liability Act.
Lane v. City of Juneau
In Lane v. City of Juneau,164 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a municipality and its
employees do not share the same type of immunity for its decisions and actions. The City of
Juneau (“the City”) operated a campground that was normally closed for the winter. To
accommodate the local homeless population, the City decided in the fall of 2009 to keep the
campground open through the winter. A city official, Marlow, hired Gordon Valle as caretaker;
his duties included administrative tasks and noise control but no law-enforcement. Though “the
campground rules expressly prohibited alcohol,” Marlow had told Valle that he could drink in his
own tent and that the rule would only be enforced against people who were disruptive. One
evening, Valle joined some other camp residents, became heavily intoxicated, and passed two of
his guns around. Among the residents present were Jon Lane and Chris Barrios, who got into an
altercation that ended with Barrios shooting Lane in the face with one of Valle’s guns. Lane then
sued the City, alleging it had been negligent in operating the campground and hiring Valle. Lane
further alleged the City was vicariously liable for Valle’s conduct. In granting the City’s motions
for summary judgment, the lower court held that the City was immune under the discretionary
function doctrine and that the City was not vicariously liable for Valle’s actions as they were
“outside the scope of his contractual duties.” The supreme court reversed explaining that while
Marlow would be protected under official immunity, the discretionary function doctrine does not
automatically apply the protection of an individual employee to the employing municipality. It
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explained that though “municipal employees enjoy personal or ‘official’ immunity for any action
involving ‘deliberation’ and ‘judgment,’ municipalities themselves enjoy immunity only for
‘planning’ decisions; they remain potentially liable for ‘operational’ decisions. . . ." The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment on the issues of negligent supervision
and vicarious liability holding that a municipality and its employees do not share the same type of
immunity for its decisions and actions; it otherwise affirmed the superior court’s judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
Lindbo v. Colaska, Inc.
In Lindbo v. Colaska, Inc.,165 the supreme court held that the trial court’s failure to give spoliation
jury instructions was not plain error. On August 21, Lindbo, a truck driver who delivered asphalt
from Colaska’s plant, arrived at the plant, stepped out of his truck, and turned his back to the
machinery. The plant operator unsuccessfully attempted to get Lindbo’s attention over the sound
of the machinery. To get his attention, the plant operator threw a can in Lindbo’s direction, but it
struck Lindbo in the lower back. Lindbo went to the emergency room for medical treatment and
later filed suit for battery and negligence. At trial, the jury awarded Lindbo over $2,500 for
compensatory damages for negligence but rejected his battery claim. Lindbo appealed, arguing
that the superior court’s failure to give an adverse inference (spoliation) jury instructions based on
Colaska’s failure to preserve the can that hit Lindbo was plain error. The court disagreed, finding
that it was not plain error. Plain error exists when an obvious mistake has been made that creates
a high likelihood that injustice has resulted. There must be a reasonable probability that the error
affected the outcome of the proceeding. Although the parties disagreed about the size and weight
of the can thrown at Lindbo, the court found that the weight of the can would not have changed
any of the jury’s findings. The only possible finding that the can could have changed was Lindbo’s
noneconomic loss award. However, the jury had ample testimony to make a noneconomic loss
award and still declined to award any amount for medical expenses. Adding an adverse inference
instruction likely would not have changed the award’s final amount. Thus, the supreme court
affirmed and held that the trial court’s failure to give spoliation jury instructions was not plain
error.
Shack v. Shack
In Shack v. Shack, 166 the supreme court held that Alaska’s bystander theory of liability does not
permit recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) when the tortfeasor and the
injured relative are the same person. In June 2014, Elizabeth Shack failed to yield the right-ofway at a stop sign causing an accident with her car and an oncoming truck. Elizabeth’s mother,
Rachel, and brother, Dylan, were nearby the accident and rushed to the scene, where they saw
Elizabeth seriously injured as a result of the crash. These injuries later led to Elizabeth’s death. In
February 2015, her family (“the Shacks”) filed a bystander claim against Elizabeth’s autoinsurance policy through her estate for NIED, arguing that even though the deceased was also the
tortfeasor, the family should still recover for its resulting emotional distress. The lower court
denied this claim stating that NIED claims are invalid when the tortfeasor and the injured relative
are the same individual. The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that
bystander claims required the injury to be caused by a third party with no pre-existing relationship
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to the bystander relatives of the injured party. Furthermore, the court found a new duty of care that
would allow recovery should not be recognized. Affirming the lower courts ruling, the supreme
court held that Alaska’s bystander theory of liability does not permit recovery when the tortfeasor
and the injured relative are the same person.
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TRUST & ESTATES LAW
Boiko v. Kapolchok
In Boiko v. Kapolchok,167 the supreme court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion
in calculating attorneys’ fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82. Boiko and Picarella filed legal
malpractice claims against Kapolchok after he represented them in a dental malpractice suit. They
contended that Kapolchok withheld information about a favorable summary judgment ruling to
induce them to settle the case. Kapolchok retained a second attorney to assist him in his defense.
After a lengthy discovery process resulting in sanction of Boiko and Picarella, they dismissed their
claims with prejudice while leaving the issue of attorney’s fees open. After the superior court
dismissed Kapolchok’s rule Rule 68 offer of judgment, it proceeded to calculate the fees due him
under Rule 82. Kapolchok argued that his fee award under Rule 82 should be enhanced from 20%
to 50% based on the unreasonableness of Boiko’s and Picarella’s claims and “their vexatious and
bad faith conduct throughout the litigation,” while Boiko and Picarella argued Kapolchok’s award
should be reduced to zero for similar reasons. The superior court ultimately awarded Kapolchok
Rule 82 attorneys’ fees but reduced the award from 20% to 15% because it found Kapolchok acted
unreasonably in paying two attorneys to defend an unremarkable legal malpractice suit, and to
avoid deterring future plaintiffs. Kapolchok appealed, challenging the superior court’s decision to
reduce, rather than enhance attorneys’ fees under Rule 82(b)(3). The supreme court affirmed. It
explained that under Rule 82(b)(2), when a prevailing party recovers no money judgment and the
case is resolved without trial, the court shall award the prevailing party 20% of its attorneys’ fees.
The court continued that this the award can be varied pursuant to Rule 82(b)(3) based on equitable
factors, including the complexity of litigation and reasonableness of the number of attorneys used.
Finally, the court noted that in reviewing Rule 82 awards it applies an abuse of discretion standard
and so it will only reverse when the award is manifestly unreasonable. Under this standard, the
supreme court determined that the superior court engaged in a proper analysis. The court noted
that the superior court reviewed Kapolchok’s itemized billing and the complexity of the case, that
it had a better perspective on those issues than did the supreme court itself, and that consideration
of chilling future plaintiffs is permitted under the Rule 82. Thus, the supreme court affirmed and
held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in reducing attorneys’ fees from 20% to
15% under Rule 82.
Cottini v. Berggren
In Cottini v. Berggren,168 the supreme court held that former agents may be entitled to attorney’s
fees for defending against their former principal’s challenge to the agent’s accounting of costs of
their former guardianship-relationship. Cottini acted as Berggren’s guardian after Berggren
suffered a traumatic brain injury. After Berggren recovered, Berggren objected to Cottini’s
accounting of fees and costs. Cottini hired an attorney to defend him from the objection, and the
parties eventually settled. After settlement, Cottini filed a motion requesting attorney’s fees
incurred during the defense. The superior court denied the motion, concluding that section
13.26.291(d) of the Alaska Statutes governed fee-shifting in a guardianship case and that it only
would only allow award of attorney’s fees if Berggren’s challenge to the accounting had been
malicious or frivolous, which it was not. The supreme court determined that section 13.26.291(d),
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various other sections of the Alaska Statutes, and ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82 did not apply to the case
so they neither prevented nor justified an award of attorney’s fees. It elaborated that the under the
common law of agency a principal has a duty to indemnify his agent for expenditures beneficial
to the principal. The supreme court explained that accordingly equity and public policy weigh in
favor of allowing a recovery of attorney’s fees if factors indicate the expenditures were beneficial
to the principal. The supreme court specified these factors include the amount of attorney’s fees,
the relative amount of assets in question, the merits of the parties’ arguments, the extent that the
defense was related to the best interests of the principal, and the duration, extent, and expense of
the defense. Reversing and remanding for consideration of these factors, the supreme court held
that a former agent in a guardianship relationship may be entitled to attorney’s fees for defending
against his former principal’s challenge to the agent’s accounting.
Hester v. Landau
In Hester v. Landau,169 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that only a personal representative of an
estate has the power to appear in court on behalf of the estate. Aurora Landau sued her former
employer for unpaid compensation, naming the company and its two owners as defendants. One
of the owners died while the case was pending, and Landau substituted his estate in her complaint.
After the lower court ultimately ruled in favor of Landau, Tracy Hester, the deceased’s widow and
sole beneficiary of his estate, moved for relief from the judgment based on improper service. She
argued that as the sole-beneficiary of the estate her financial interest was identical to its interest
and that she therefore possessed interest-injury standing. On appeal, the supreme court rejected
this argument and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court found that though Hester was
an interested person under Alaska’s probate law, she was not a personal representative of the estate
and so lacked standing to sue on its behalf. The court explained that the probate code is careful to
ensure there is no lapse in coverage between different personal representatives of an estate, and
that it also provides other remedies to interested persons short of authorizing them to act as legal
representatives. From this the court concluded that these provisions would not exist if someone
other than a personal representative could take legal action on behalf of an estate. Affirming the
lower court’s judgment, the supreme court held that only a personal representative of an estate has
the power to appear in court on behalf of the estate.
In re Estate of Seward
In the case In re Estate of Seward,170 the supreme court held that purported children of a decedent
intervening in probate preceding are not required to bring a separate paternity cause of action.
Seward died in May 2013 after executing a will in 2008 that declared he had no spouse or children.
In an October 2013 probate proceeding Vincent Mock asserted that Seward was his father. The
superior court ruled that paternity determinations could not be made in probate proceedings and
that Vincent was not interested parties, barring him from the proceedings. In an earlier appeal, the
supreme court determined that Vincent was not entitled to relief as a pretermitted heir, but it noted
that, if he was Seward’s son, Vincent might be entitled to a statutory allowance. After the supreme
court ordered supplemental briefing on the issue, the superior court ruled that Vincent’s claim to
parentage was distinct from his claim to a property allowance and that it was therefore barred by
a statute of limitations. The supreme court reversed, reasoning that, despite caselaw previously
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referring to paternity determinations as “paternity actions,” paternity determinations are elements
of other claims rather than separable causes of action. The court elaborated that paternity
determinations may be conducted as part of a claim on an estate and so are subject to the time
constraints of the probate code rather than a separate statute of limitations. Concluding that various
time-limits on probate proceedings did not apply or had not run, the supreme court reversed and
remanded, holding that paternity claims may be brought in conjunction with probate proceedings
as they do not constitute a separate cause of action.
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